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Currently, while there is much research and literature dedicated to the topics of peacekeeping 
security and information systems, there is almost no research or literature that discusses the 
relationship between the two. The aim of this thesis is to clarify and elucidate information 
surrounding the scarcely researched topic of information systems in the context of peacekeep-
ing. In elucidating this information, this paper can serve as a research tool, contributing to-
wards the development of education of this topic, for example, in universities and academies. 
In doing so, this paper aims to help students who may enter the fields of Information Security, 
Information Systems or Peacekeeping. So that they can better contribute towards a future that 
ensures the best people are employed to develop and operate these information systems.  
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to obtain and amalgamate findings from the research 
and literature surrounding the topics of information systems and peacekeeping organizations. 
Primarily, the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the British 
Army. The sub-topic of information security, and the importance it plays between peacekeeper 
security and information systems, will be used to contribute to the analysis of the relationship 
between information systems and peacekeeper security.  
To achieve this aim, the primary objective of this thesis, is to analyze the topics of peacekeep-
ing, peacekeeper security, information systems and information security, followed by three 
real information systems, currently used in UN, NATO and British Army peacekeeping opera-
tions. The systems are Deployable Communication Information Systems (DCIS) type information 
systems, namely the UN Modular Command Centre (UN MCC), NATO DCIS, BAE FALCON. In an-
alyzing these systems, the relationship between each system and peacekeeper security will be 
shown. More specifically, it will be determined which system aspects contribute towards peace-
keeper security, and how it is achieved in the context of peacekeeping threats. And therefore, 
the information system requirements, too. 
Keywords: Information System, Information Security, Peacekeeping, Command & Control, Sit-
uational Awareness, Interoperability. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper comprises six chapters: ‘Introduction’, ‘Peacekeeping’, ‘Information Security’, ‘In-
formation Systems’, ‘Deployable Communication Information System Analysis’ and ‘Conclu-
sions’. In the first chapter, the aim and purpose of peacekeeping, its history, and its modern 
environment today, will be discussed, including threats and operational types, which will later 
be linked to the research question of this thesis: ‘what is the relationship between information 
systems and peacekeeper security?’ In the second chapter, will be introduced the information 
security threats present in the modern peacekeeping environment, leading on to why infor-
mation security protective measures must be used by peacekeeping organizations. Chapter 3 
will introduce the information system functions, as well as two key concepts which will be used 
as a theoretical framework to determine the purpose of an information system in the context 
of peacekeeping operations – Lawson’s Model of Command & Control, and the OODA Loop. 
Elements of the concepts will be referenced to and their importance in peacekeeper security 
will be made more apparent in the next, and second focus chapter of this thesis, ‘Deployable 
Communication Information System Analysis’. 
The different types of peacekeeping mission and the methods used to conduct them vary 
greatly, and each will be discussed. Peacekeeping threats, information system fundamentals, 
the role they play during peacekeeping operations, and their relationship with peacekeeper 
security will also be discussed. ‘Peacekeeper security’, will be defined as a state in which 
peacekeepers are protected and kept safe from threats which may cause them harm or put 
their lives in danger. The concepts of situational awareness and operational intelligence and 
the relationships they have between information systems and peacekeeper security will also be 
discussed to determine how situational awareness is critical to ensuring peacekeeper security. 
After determining the roles information systems play in peacekeeping operations and how they 
are used to provide security to peacekeepers during operations, a relationship between infor-
mation systems and a different type of security, directly related to the security of the infor-
mation systems themselves, will be discussed – information security. In this discussion, it will 
be introduced how information security is connected to the continuity of the overall function-
ality of an information system, and therefore how information security is also crucial to peace-
keeper security. After the discussions of peacekeeping, information systems, information secu-
rity and the relationships they have with one another, the concept of Deployable Communica-
tions Information Systems (DCIS) will be introduced. Followed by an analysis of three real DCIS 
systems currently in use in peacekeeping operations. DCISs are a type of information system 
with the core purpose of communication. Of which, information (data) continually flows be-
tween an operational environment and other system users, through the DCIS. 
While each of these three topics and their relationships with each other are important, it must 
be noted that the focus of this paper is the relationship between information systems used by 
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peacekeeping organizations and peacekeeper security. In chapter four, ‘Command & Control 
Concepts’, two key concepts about communication and transmission of information between 
an operational environment, an organization ’s forces, and other parts of an organization  will 
be discussed, namely Lawson’s Model of Command & Control and The OODA Loop.  
1.1 Research Questions 
The research questions are as follows: 
• How do information systems used in peacekeeping operations contribute to peace-
keeper security? 
• How does information security, information Confidentiality Integrity Availability (CIA), 
and its relationship with information systems affect peacekeeper security? 
1.2 Literature Review 
There has been much work and literature related to the independent fields of peacekeeping, 
peacekeeper security, situational awareness, information systems and information security, 
which form the framework of this paper in answering the main research question: ‘what is the 
relationship between information systems and peacekeeper security?’ However, there is little 
literature that assess these different field collectively, or the relationships they have with one 
another. Or, they present a different viewpoint which this paper challenges. For example, Cul-
ture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions (2008), presents the viewpoint that interoper-
ability in missions is achieved almost exclusively through the human component, specifically 
cultural understanding, and effective interactions between different parties. In this paper, 
however, that viewpoint is challenged, in addressing the technical aspect of interoperability. 
Which is that information systems need to be connected with one another and organizations 
need to have common information sharing platforms. While this paper and the literature disa-
gree on the method of interoperability, the outcome, however, as with other literature is 
agreed upon in that it strengthens cooperation between parties to accomplish operational 
goals. And, in doing so, matching the context of this paper, enhances peacekeeper security. 
1.2.1 Peacekeeping Literature 
While both the UN and NATO can be considered peacekeeping organizations (though NATO con-
ducts other activities too (including crisis management and civil emergency missions) who both 
conduct peacekeeping operations, the United Nations (UN) is the world’s leading peacekeeping 
organization, both in terms of scale and operational history. For example, in reflecting the UN’s 
scale, they “keep peace with 102,482 peacekeepers in 14 operations around the world” (the 
UN has 13 global peacekeeping operations as of 2020), as well as assisting and protecting “71.4 
million people fleeing famine, war, and persecution” as listed on the regularly updated UN Card 
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which highlights ten quantifiable actions of the UN in their global work. Regarding operational 
history, the UN has conducted peacekeeping operations since the early nineties in the Balkans 
alongside NATO. And they continue to conduct joint operations around the globe working with 
nations around the world who attach their solders from their Armed Forces as part of a joint 
force in UN peacekeeping operations, as is the case in with the UN’s current 13 operations, as 
visible on their website. These are the key reasons why the UN is regarded as the world’s 
leading peacekeeping organization. Therefore, throughout this thesis, the UN will be used as 
the backbone of this paper in terms of referencing, definitions, and operational examples. 
Historical literature and electronic publications have been used to obtain qualitative data in 
providing a brief history of modern UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. With the first glob-
ally recognized peacekeeping operations beginning in the Balkans during the early nineties, the 
Balkans became “Europe’s security policy testing ground” (1999, 7), as former U.S. Secretary 
General Javier Solana said in the NATO Review, ‘NATO Steps Boldly into the 21st Century’. 
Beginning in Croatia in 1992 with the deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UN-
PROFOR), followed by supporting NATO’s ‘Operation Maritime Monitor’ (16 July to 22 November 
1992). Information relating to Balkans peacekeeping has been obtained from the mission profile 
of UNPROFOR on the ‘Past Operations’ section of the UN official website, as well as the ‘Ter-
minated Missions’ section of the official NATO website. 
Regarding current UN operations, such as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) the 
data and references used in this thesis, has been collected largely from the current operations 
section of the UN official website. The United Kingdom is an example of a UN member nation 
who attaches members of its Armed Forces to UN forces in peacekeeping operations and will 
be referred to throughout this thesis. As of 2020, the UK is ranked the 47th biggest troop con-
tributor, with “279” troops currently contributed to UN peacekeeping operations, as according 
to official statistics on the ‘Troop and Police Contributions’ section of their website. 
Figure 1 below, demonstrates the top troop contributions from UN member countries including 
the United Kingdom, for one of the UNs biggest current operations, the United Nations Mission 
for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). While Figure 2 shows the top troop contrib-
utors of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the latter of which pri-
marily involves United Kingdom troops from the British Army, exemplify the wide array of na-
tionalities that send attachment forces to UN peacekeeping missions.  
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Regarding the interoperability aspect of information systems used by the UN and NATO, both 
internally and externally, including with armed forces of other UN member nations like the 
British Army, it is crucial to operational success. So, literature from various printed and elec-
tronic publications has been used to collect data and references. The United Kingdom, as one 
of the original and founding UN members since 1945, alongside 50 other founding members, 
such as the Republic of China, United States of America, and the Unions of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, as according to the official ‘Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present’ 
section of their website. 
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And the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces, as one of the world’s most technologically advanced 
and powerful militaries, will be used in tandem with one of their biggest information systems - 
the BAE FALCON, to demonstrate the importance of interoperable information systems in 
peacekeeping. Interoperability is a key concept which will be discussed later in this thesis. The 
United Nations Modular Command Centre (UN MCC), and the NATO Deployable Communication 
and Information System (DCIS), will also be used to prove the importance of interoperability in 
peacekeeping, as well as in answering the research questions of this paper. The importance of 
interoperability will be demonstrated by analyzing the different capabilities of these infor-
mation systems and it will be determined what each system offers in contributing towards 
peacekeeper security during operations. 
It is not only what the differing capabilities of different information systems can offer to oper-
ations, however. It is also the ability to communicate between different forces which is crucial 
for situational awareness and peacekeeper security, which is where the biggest significance in 
the concept of interoperability will be found and discussed in this paper. The significance of 
interoperability will contribute towards answering the research question ‘what is the relation-
ship between information systems used by peacekeeping organizations and peacekeeper secu-
rity? 
1.2.2 Research Gaps in Literature This Paper Expands On 
To understand why the literature that has been chosen to research the fields and concepts in 
this paper, and what research gaps in literature this paper expands on, the definitions of these 
fields and concepts must first be understood. The fields of which this paper discusses and refers 
to literature of, have quite universal definitions. The exception, however, is the core topic of 
Information Systems. Because the term ‘Information System’ is a very broad term because In-
formation Systems are used in various forms, for different purposes, in almost every industry 
and profession. Therefore, there is no universal definition, and it is harder to pinpoint the 
appropriate literature to reference to in this thesis. Furthermore, there is no literature niche 
for Information Systems used in Peacekeeping.  
To avert any problems this research gap in literature could cause, only general literature re-
lating to the basics of Information Systems, answering fundamental questions like ‘what is an 
information system?’, ‘what is the purpose of an information system’ and ‘how does an infor-
mation system work?’, have been used as the literature foundation of this thesis. Some of the 
specific literature of which will be mentioned, shortly. The information and key concepts of 
Information Systems, obtained from this literature, will be applied and used in the context of 
Peacekeeping and the environments in which peacekeeping organizations operate, in tandem 
with Peacekeeping literature and literature related to the specific Information Systems which 
will be analyzed in this paper. This is how this paper will expand on the research gap in litera-
ture relating to the Information Systems in the context of Peacekeeping. Rather than using 
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literature that addresses Information Systems in a specific context, largely the field of Business. 
Such as: Business Driven Information Systems (2006), Essentials of Business Information Systems 
(1994), Business Information Systems (1999).  
There is much work and literature dedicated and related to the fields of Peacekeeping, Infor-
mation Systems, and Information Security, independently, the primary fields comprising the 
content of this paper. Acclaimed publications in these fields which have been used to research 
these fields for this paper include: The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Op-
erations (Koops, J., MacQueen, N., Tardy, T., Williams, P. 2015), ‘Does Peacekeeping Work?’ 
(Fortna, P. 2008), Principles of Information Systems (Stair, R., Reynolds, G. 2012), Fundamen-
tals of Information Systems (Stair, R., Reynolds, G. 2012) Information Systems for Business and 
Beyond (Bourgeois, D.T. 2014), and Computer and Information Security Handbook (Vacca, J.R. 
2009). The two key concepts that will be discussed significantly throughout this paper in rela-
tion to these fields, as two of the main arguments of how information systems contribute to-
wards peacekeeper security, are Interoperability, and Command & Control (C2). There is also 
much literature surrounding these two concepts, including: Information Systems Interoperabil-
ity (Krämer, B., Papazoglou, M., Schmidt, H.1998), Intelligent Integration of Information 
(Wiederhold, G. 1996) Command Concepts (Builder, C.H., Bankes, S.C, Nordin, R. 1999), and 
Modelling Command and Control (Baber, C., Harris, D., Stanton, N. 2008). 
However, while there is a substantial amount of literature surrounding these fields and concepts 
independently, there is little literature that addresses the relationship between these fields, 
of which the main research question of this thesis is based. There is some literature addressing 
the relationship between two or more of these fields and concepts, for example, Information 
Systems Interoperability (1998) addresses the field of Information Systems and the concept of 
Interoperability, as does Intelligent Integration of Information (1996). But there seems to be no 
literature which amalgamate each of these fields and concepts into a single piece of literature. 
This paper achieves the amalgamation of these fields and concepts and addresses the relation-
ships between them as the framework of this thesis. Thus, addressing the overall relationship 
between information systems and peacekeeper security and answer the research question 
‘what is the relationship between Information Systems and Peacekeeper Security?’. This is the 
research gap in literature this paper expands on. 
1.2.3 Terminology and Concepts Definitions 
• CIA Triad: The CIA Triad, as visible by Figure 3 below from F5 Labs Application Threat 
Intelligence, a cyber security educational website, encompasses three core compo-
nents: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA). These three components, when 
protected by information security measures such as information security controls, en-
sure data is protected. The CIA triad will be used extensively in this thesis to discuss 
the reasons why security controls of information systems are in place to protect the 
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data that is managed by information systems during peacekeeping operations, which in 
turn protects peacekeeper security. Security controls that ensure the Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability of information will be discussed particularly in Chapter 5, 
Deployable Communications Information System Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Command & Control (C2): As defined in C2 Re-envisioned: The Future of the Enterprise 
(Alberts, Agre, Vassiliou, 2014), C2 is “the set of organizational and technical attributes 
and processes by which an enterprise marshals and employs human, physical, and in-
formation resources to solve problems and accomplish missions” C2 will be used in this 
paper as a key attribute of which peacekeeper security and the key information re-
source that will be discussed in unison with C2, is situational awareness, to enhance it. 
In this paper, C2 will encompass the human aspects, primarily focused on how com-
manders in the command and control elements of an information system enact deci-
sions, as well as the physical and technical aspects by which information can be shared 
and received. Using C2 as a means of issuing orders and making decisions is the key C2 
method in this paper of contribution to peacekeeper security. Cruz, Cusimano, and 
Phillips explain the importance of C2 to protect the security of peacekeepers in the 
United Nations report, ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers’ (2017). 
Saying that “the quality of leadership at the sector level, battalion level and below is 
essential to the maintenance of security of peacekeepers” because it is at the C2 level 
of peacekeeping organizations, that “the majority of operations are planned and exe-
cuted” (2017, 19). 
• Deployable Communications Information System: An information system which can 
be deployed in any environment which a peacekeeping organization  is likely to oper-
ate, which can operate with a command and control function, and can provide 
Figure 3: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability Triad (Walkowski, 2019) 
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situational awareness. Deployable Communication Information Systems (DCIS) will be 
analyzed in Chapter 5 of this paper to provide real examples of the determined aspects 
of information systems that contribute to peacekeeper security, as well as of infor-
mation security controls. The United Nations Modular Command Centre (UN MCC), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Deployable Communication & Information System (NATO 
DCIS) and BAE FALCON will be used in the analysis.  
• Interoperability: As defined in the NATO document “Interoperability for Joint Opera-
tions” (2006), “Interoperability refers to the ability of different military organizations 
to conduct joint operations. These organizations can be of different nationalities or 
different armed services (ground, naval and air forces) or both. Interoperability allows 
forces, units, or systems to operate together. In this paper, while no in-depth analysis 
is conducted of the technical measures of information systems which allow for interop-
erability, the focus of interoperability in this paper will be of information systems. 
Specifically, the ability for organizations to share information throughout their organi-
zation, as well as with other organizations. Interoperability will be discussed from a 
theoretical perspective, determining the benefits and methods of interoperability in 
relation to peacekeeper security.  
• Peacekeeping: activities which “provide security and the political and peacebuilding 
support to help countries make the transition from conflict to peace” (UN) 
• Peacekeeper Security: In this paper, the term peacekeeper security, will be defined 
as a state in which peacekeepers are able to successfully conduct their operation while 
being situationally aware of present threats, and absent from immediate danger threats 
in an operational environment may cause to peacekeepers.  
• Situational Awareness: “the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of 
their status in the near future” (Endsley 1988). Situational Awareness, will be the pri-
mary type of information to be analyzed and discussed in this paper as a means of 
providing an awareness of an operational environment and the threats it contains to 
stakeholders and Command & Control elements of an organization.  
• Situational Understanding: is the product of receiving, analyzing, and interpreting sit-
uational awareness. And as defined in the paper ‘How Are Situation Picture, Situation 
Awareness, and Situation Understanding Discussed in Recent Scholarly Literature?’ (Ru-
oslahti, Tikanmaki, 2019) it is “how the situation is or can be formed and how the 
different activities affect the developing situation”. Situational understanding will be 
primarily be discussed in this paper from the perspective of Command & Control 
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elements as a means of enabling them to enact orders and decision which contribute 
towards peacekeeper security.  
1.3 Methodology 
To use different sources of information to increase the validity and reliability of finding in this 
thesis, the triangulation method of research has been used in this paper. Sources include, 
United Nations peacekeeping mission reports, in which graphs, statistics, and opinions have 
been gathered as well as implemented using the triangulation method. Additional sources in-
clude This multi-method approach for obtaining and implementing qualitative research, using 
qualitative research, includes, comparative research, historical research, case studies and the-
oretical research. The primary category of research used to answer the research questions in 
this thesis is primarily qualitative; focusing on the definitions and published literature surround-
ing the concepts that are discussed in this paper, to give an accurate, relevant and balanced 
discussion of the topics in this thesis as well as analysis of the three Deployable Communication 
Information Systems in the Deployable Communication Information System Analysis, Chapter 5.  
Chapter 5 obtains the tangible findings and examples from the largely theoretical perspective 
that will be discussed throughout the other chapters, where the finding are obtained through 
conducting an analysis of the three systems through both assessing the systems individually, as 
well as comparing the facts and data found on the three systems to make connections between 
the facts and data to find out what the common themes of the systems are in answering the 
research questions of ‘what is the relationship between information systems and peacekeeper 
security?’ and ‘how do deployable information systems contribute to peacekeeper security?’. 
The methods of finding the data used for the findings of these questions are reviews, articles, 
info-graphics sheets, and educational videos. 
Some quantitative research has also been used to support the primary method of research which 
is qualitative research. This research includes facts and dates about background and historical 
information surrounding peacekeeping, beginning with being included in a brief introduction to 
the first modern peacekeeping operations which were commenced by the UN and NATO in the 
Balkans during the early nineties in the “Peacekeeping” chapter, as well as statistics that sup-
port the need for the research question of this thesis, including peacekeeper casualty statistics 
and attack statistics on peacekeeping bases, as mentioned in the report UN report Improving 
Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017) by Cusimano, Phillips, and Lt General (Retired) 
Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, who was Force Commander of United Nations Stabilisation Mis-
sion in Haiti (MINUSTAH) United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Quantitative research has also been obtained and imple-
mented throughout the three analyses  of the United Nations Modular Command Centre, NATO 
Deployable Communication Information System, and the BAE FALCON in the “Deployable Com-
munications Information Systems Analysis” chapter, in providing statistical data that that 
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support how the technical and physical security controls of the DCIS systems, the primary con-
tributors in answering the research question: “How do deployable communication and infor-
mation systems contribute towards peacekeeper security?”.  
For example, statistics have been used relating to the operating temperature regarding physical 
controls. This data has been collected from a variety of electronic literature sources, mainly 
tertiary research in the form of educational videos. In the case of the sources for the BAE 
FALCON analysis, documents from the BAE Systems official website have been used as the pri-
mary source of information, namely the BAE FALCON Brochure (BAE Systems 2011), Fact Sheet 
(BAE Systems) and Infographic (BAE Systems). Other statistical information has come from UN 
peacekeeping mission reports, again including from Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto 
dos Santos Cruz’ report Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017), as well as 
NATO Reviews, including The Washington Summit: NATO Steps Boldly Into the 21st Century writ-
ten by former US Secretary General Javier Solana. While the administrative controls, however, 
by nature have been implemented with the qualitative research method, as the measures of 
administrative controls relate to the practices and personnel of an organization, which gener-
ally are not quantifiable.  
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2 Peacekeeping 
To begin answering the research questions of this paper, the nature and background of the 
/modern peacekeeping environment must first be understood. So that the role information 
systems have in the modern peacekeeping environment can also understood, allowing the in-
formation systems which will be discussed in this paper to be analyzed accurately and effec-
tively to answer the research questions of this paper. One key point to begin understanding the 
modern peacekeeping environment is that while the organizations around the world that con-
duct peacekeeping activities can differ in nature, as well as in mandates and objectives, by 
and large, the purpose and definition of peacekeeping is generally the same. Which, as how 
the UN describes the roles of UN peacekeepers on the peacekeeping section of their official 
website, peacekeeping is defined as activities that help countries emerging from a conflict, 
make the “transition from conflict to peace”, achieved through providing “security and the 
political and peacebuilding support”. 
Peacekeeping missions are only conducted after all attempts of the peaceful settlement of 
disputes between belligerent forces have failed, as mentioned in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 
Methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, as mentioned in Article 33, Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter, which requires countries with disputes that could lead to war must first the methods: 
“negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to re-
gional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice”. If the methods of 
dispute resolution fail and conflict becomes unavoidable, Chapter VII of the UN Charter sets 
the parameters of the UN’s powers to restore international peace and security, be it through 
military or non-military action.  
Since its formation at the end of the Second World War, the UN, enacted, alongside NATO, the 
first official peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, and particularly in Kosovo, during the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, in 1994. After the UN, they are recognized as the second largest peace-
keeping organization in the world. The Balkans became known as "Europe's security-policy test-
ing ground" (Salana 1999) and peacekeeping began with the deployment of the original UN 
protection force to Croatia in 1992, followed by Bosnia and then Macedonia. “What was origi-
nally envisaged as a six-month deployment lasted for four years”, says Salana (1999, 7). 
This is where the first real lessons of effective peacekeeping were realised, reflecting the com-
plications of peacekeeping in the complex and volatile fourth generation warfare environment, 
where "frequently, the situation is complicated by the presence of warlords and conflict entre-
preneurs, prepared to exploit myths and instigate violence to help seize or retain power", says 
Espen Barth Eide, State Secretary in the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the 
NATO Review Article, Peacekeeping Past & Present (2001). The unpredictable and volatile na-
ture of these relatively new and modern environments peacekeepers operate, have created a 
crucial need for deployable information systems which can be rapidly deployed at any location, 
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able to provide a Command & Control function. This is where the new concept of Deployable 
Communication Information Systems (DCIS) has emerged, as most effective information system 
of its kind and the most effective information management asset available in the field to peace-
keepers. 
2.1 Peacekeeping Organizations 
In terms of length of operational history, organizational size and scale, the UN is the world’s 
most prevalent peacekeeping organization. With a budget of “$6.51 billion for 13 peacekeeping 
operations in 2019 and 2020”, as stated on the ‘Meetings coverage and Press Releases’ section 
of the UN official website, from a UN General Assembly meeting on 3 July 2019. According to 
the ‘How We Are Funded’ section of the UN official website, “this amount finances 12 of the 
13 United Nations peacekeeping operations, supports logistics for the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM), and provides support, technology and logistics to all peace operations 
through global service centres in Brindisi (Italy) and a regional service centre in Entebbe 
(Uganda)”. The amount includes paying for the just over 100,000 active peacekeeping person-
nel for the 13 current UN peacekeeping operations as of 2020.  
Because of the UN’s large size and scale, as well as the reputation the UN has gained through 
their lengthy history organizational history since being formed in 1945, the UN and their peace-
keepers, easily recognisable by the distinctive blue ‘UN’ marked helmets, are widely regarded 
to be the main actors of global peacekeeping operations. The other key organizations, in terms 
of global peacekeeping presence, is NATO. Conducting both independent and joint peacekeep-
ing operations, with other organizations or military forces. But more often, alongside the UN in 
joint peacekeeping operations or missions. A new peacekeeping concept and term of ‘hybrid’ 
peacekeeping missions is emerging, however, as a new and more appropriate way of describing 
joint peacekeeping missions, to reflect the changes of the modern peacekeeping environment 
and the more collaborative and diplomatic approach organizations are applying in their mis-
sions. The United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is the first example of a 
‘hybrid’ peacekeeping mission, although the UN has worked with other organizations countless 
times throughout the history of peacekeeping.  
In addition to the UN, the other organizations that will be discussed and referenced in this 
paper for their peacekeeping activities and whose information systems will be analyzed, is 
NATO and the British Army. The UN, NATO and the British Army have been chosen for discussion, 
comparison, and analysis of their information systems in the context of peacekeeping in this 
paper, is largely for one reason. Because, while the nature and mandates of these organizations 
have some significant differences, the peacekeeping operations they conduct, and the infor-
mation systems that are used to support their operations, have many similarities. Providing the 
opportunity for a rich, more accurate and reliable information system comparison in this paper.  
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The comparison and analysis of the information systems used by these organization in Chapter 
5 of this paper is what will primarily contribute towards the purpose and aim of this thesis, 
which is to amalgamate information about information systems used by peacekeeping organi-
zations to further the development of teaching and learning in the fields of information sys-
tems, peacekeeping, and information security. In doing so, answering the research questions 
of this paper. 
2.1.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
NATO is another organization highly prominent in global peacekeeping activities, following 
closely behind the UN in supporting the global peacekeeping cause. NATO shares a commonality 
with the UN in that it also began its peacekeeping activities in the Balkans in 1992, during the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. Leading the military offensives against Serbia in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. NATO is a political and military alliance with the purpose to "guarantee the freedom 
and security of its members through political and military means", according to the ‘What Is 
NATO?’ section of their official website. NATO operates globally in every kind of environment 
and terrain to meet this objective. In terms of power, with 29 member countries from the U.S. 
and Europe, as well as 40 partner countries, NATO has greater offensive and military capabili-
ties than the UN.  
Regarding NATO’s large organizational size and scale, as is the case with the UN, there is an 
imperative need for native and fully interoperable information systems that every member 
countries’ forces can use, especially when conducting joint peacekeeping operations. NATO 
achieves this with the UN MCC (United Nations Modular Command Centre), of which its interop-
erability will be analyzed later in this paper, in relation to the research questions of this paper. 
Regarding organizational structure, NATO's diverse and often large-scale international peace-
keeping activities, as is also the case with the UN, mean that a clear chain of command is vital 
for the use of an information system to conduct peacekeeping operations.  
NATO often operates in extremely hostile and dangerous environments, as do the British Army 
and UN. Depending on the type of peacekeeping mission, and mandate under which a NATO 
operation is authorised, NATO’s strong-point - military force, is often required. Which is par-
ticularly useful in peace-enforcement missions, for example. NATO operations could be in an 
active conflict or warzone, or a zone which is recently emerging from a war or conflict – the 
first NATO military operations in Bosnia, during and after the break-up of Yugoslavia, from 1992 
– 2004 testify to this. The Yugoslav Wars period, and the Bosnian War (1992-1995) which NATO 
was heavily involved in alongside the UN, testifies to the level of danger peacekeepers can 
face. The Yugoslav Wars, ending with the Kosovo War (1998 – 1999) were the last of the twen-
tieth century, and arguably of the twenty-first century. Involving NATO and other Western 
peacekeeping forces, including the UN and British Army, in which there occurred armed con-
flicts against an official army – primarily Serbia’s Army, ‘Republika Srpska’.  
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2.1.2 United Nations (UN) 
Similarly, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the UN constantly pursues a core mission 
of “the maintenance of international peace and security”. This includes, protecting human 
rights, delivers humanitarian aid, promotes sustainable development, and helps uphold inter-
national law. Comprising of 193-member states (every country in the world apart from the Holy 
See and the State of Palestine), the UN not only the largest peacekeeping organization  in the 
world, but also the largest international governmental body in the world, too.  
Unlike NATO which is a military alliance, the UN is defined simply as an “international organi-
zation ”, their activities aiming to avoid military force whenever possible, as guided by the 
“non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate” principle, one of three 
principles which is the backbone in guiding the mandates of their peacekeeping operations and 
the methods of their peacekeeping activities. The other principles are: “consent of the parties” 
and “impartiality”. These principles govern the five activities of the UN: “maintain interna-
tional peace and security”, “protect human rights”, “deliver humanitarian aid”, “promote sus-
tainable development” and “uphold international law”. These activities reflect their peace-
keeping objectives and greatly influence the mandates of their peacekeeping operations. 
Deriving from the large and global scale of the UN, the organizational structure comprises of 
"organs", as opposed to structures and divisions in NATO. The six organs of the UN are the: 
General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, Inter-
national Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. Similarly, to NATO, the six UN organs are part 
of one overall structure. At the top of this structure is the General Assembly. With all 193 states 
represented, it is the biggest and most important organ of the UN, as the "main deliberative, 
policy making and representative organ of the UN. Following a hierarchical organizational struc-
ture, the Secretariat organ is at the bottom of the organ structure, with tens of thousands of 
international UN staff members. Also relating to UN’s large size and global nature, the UN also 
divides itself into agencies, each conducting different activities to contribute to the UN’s over-
all objectives and can play key roles in supporting UN peacekeeping operations. This depends 
on what the UN agency is and what its purpose is, however. 
Perhaps the most crucial agencies in terms of supporting the information systems used on 
peacekeeping operations, such as the UN Modular Command Centre, is the United Nations 
Global Service Centre (UN GSC). The UN GSC, headquartered in Valencia, Spain, and Brindisi, 
Italy, supports UN peacekeeping operations by providing three core services, Supply Chain Ser-
vice (SCS), Service for Geospatial, Information and Telecommunications Technologies services 
(SGITT), and lastly Central Service (CS). It is the first two of these services which “represent 
the core of UNGSC's service provision to peace operations”.  
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2.1.3 British Army 
The British Army, as one of the three services that form the British Armed Forces, alongside 
the Royal Navy and Royal Airforce, is not a global, international organization like NATO and the 
UN. And is therefore a lot smaller in scale, with “112,000 regular and reserve personnel”, ac-
cording to the homepage of the British Army’s official website. This is not to say the British 
Army does not operate globally and internationally, which they do, with “43,390 soldiers de-
ployed on tasks in over 40 countries across the globe in 2017”. But that the British Army is 
based and run only from within the UK. Baring this in mind, the British Army will be referred to 
as a ‘military service’ or ‘armed force’, for the remainder of this paper, as opposed to an 
organization. The reason an Armed Forces has been selected among the UN and NATO as a 
frame of reference is to add an element of variation to the analyses conducted in this paper, 
enhancing the academic quality and reliability of this paper. The information system employed 
by the British Army which will be discussed and analyzed in Chapter 5 of this paper, is the BAE 
FALCON. 
The British Army has the core purpose to “protect the United Kingdom’s interests at home and 
abroad, providing a safe and secure environment in which all British citizens can live and pros-
per”. While this is the core purpose of the British Army, peacekeeping is an important part of 
the British Army’s activities. On the ‘What We Do’ section of the ‘Army’ section of the British 
MOD official website, there are four key activities that the British Army conducts: “Protect The 
UK”, “Prevent Conflict”, “Deal With Disaster”, and “Fight The Nation’s Enemies”. It is the 
“Prevent Conflict” activity which refers to the British Army’s peacekeeping activities. Of this 
activity on the same section of the British Army’s website, it says: “it is in the UK’s interest to 
tackle causes of instability, fragility and conflict, and to respond rapidly to prevent them – or 
deal with the instability and conflict that does emerge”.  
The UK and the British Army has proved this by preventing and engaging in many conflicts 
throughout the 20th and 21st centuries when military intervention was necessary. Such involve-
ments include: The Gulf War (1990-91), Bosnian War (1992-96), Operation Desert Fox (1998), 
Kosovo War (1999), Sierra Leone Civil War (2000), Libyan Civil War (2011), Syrian Civil War 
(2018), and the ongoing ‘War On Terror’. In addition to these military engagements, interven-
tions and other such peacekeeping activities mentioned above, the UK, according to official UN 
data, is among 120 UN member nations who contribute troops to UN peacekeeping missions, as 
an attachment to a UN force. Most of which are from the British Army. For example, on the 
current UNFICYP mission in Cyprus the UK has attached “244” British troops. 
Regarding the British Army’s position in the overall structure of the British Armed Forces, which 
is part of the overall Ministry of Defence (MOD) structure, the British Army, alongside the Royal 
Navy and the Royal Air Force, are the three services that comprise the British Armed Forces, 
which is controlled by Strategic Command (UKStratCom). The British Armed Forces is headed 
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by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the most senior uniformed military adviser, which currently 
is “General Sir Nick Carter”, as according to the ‘Ministry of Defence’ section of the UK Gov-
ernment official website. The CDS reports to and advises the Secretary of State for Defence, 
who heads the MOD, which is currently “Ben Wallace MP” (Member of Parliament). So to sum-
marise the British Army’s position in the MOD organizational structure, as the British Army is 
part of the British Armed Forces, which is headed by the Chief of Defence Staff, the British 
Army is on the second to highest level of hierarchy. Because General Sir Nick Carter is the head 
senior military official, and the senior military officials is the second level of hierarchy in the 
MOD, after the Ministers, who are ultimately in charge of the MOD. 
2.2 Peacekeeping Operations 
Peacekeeping operations have been conducted on every continent of the globe, with current 
UN missions including MINURSO in the Western Sahara, UNFICYP in Cyprus, UNTSO in the Middle 
East and UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan. The methods of which peacekeeping operations are 
conducted is dependent on the nature of the conflicted environment in which an organization 
operates. In the most simplistic sense, peacekeeping methods can be defined as military and 
non-military. It is the mandates of peacekeeping operations that define the authority and pow-
ers, and therefore the methods of which an organization conducts a peacekeeping operation.  
In the context of UN peacekeeping operations, the UN Security Council authorises missions. The 
methods of which an operation is conducted can be defined into four categories: observational 
missions, inter-positional missions, multidimensional missions, and peace enforcement mis-
sions. These types of mission, among other factors can present various dangers to peacekeep-
ers, in turn affecting the capabilities of information systems to provide security largely 
achieved through situational awareness. 
2.2.1 Peacekeeping Threats 
There are often many and various dangers present to peacekeepers during peacekeeping mis-
sions and operations. The risky, unpredictable, and unstable environments in which peacekeep-
ers operate is largely the reason why. Examples of types of political and governmental situa-
tions which precipitate conflict in a given country, and therefore dangerous operational envi-
ronments for peacekeepers, include: “failed governance, conflict spill over, vulnerabilities in 
ungoverned strategic spaces and resource rich territories, border disputes, extremism and un-
controlled migration”, according to Kalle Kallio in the paper Peace Operations: Supporting Or-
ganization by Efficiency (2017, 30). 
The following steps from Figure 4, from the educational United Nations video, Security & Rule 
of Law in the Field (2011) are a typical process during a country’s transition from conflict to 
peace, in which there are many threats still present to peacekeepers – such as IEDs (Step 1 
below).Each step below are also typical mission objective which must executed sequentially in 
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order to safely remove threats and re-build law and order correctly. During these missions in 
which UN forces directly help with this transition process, they do so with the purpose of re-
establishing and maintaining security and rule of law – the lack of which are another one of the 
main reasons why there are often many and varying dangers present to peacekeepers.  
 
 
 
 
After the re-establishment of law and order and security, as accomplished in step 6, the dangers 
which were present not only to peacekeepers, but to civilians, too, have mostly been removed. 
Aside general factors related to the country in which a peacekeeping mission is being con-
ducted, and that country’s governmental and political situation, the dangers which may be 
present to peacekeepers are also highly related to the type of peacekeeping mission which is 
being conducted. In reference to Page Fortna’s ‘Does Peacekeeping Work?’ (2008, Chapter 7) 
there are four types of peacekeeping operations, of which the methods in which they are con-
ducted are heavily influenced by the mandate of which they are authorised. The four missions 
are as follows:  
Step 1: "UN Mine Action Service clears left over 
landmines and unexploded bombs on roads, buildings 
and fields 
Step 2: Police, civillian, military peacekeepers move 
into the area. 
Step 3: Disarm, demobilise and reintegrate former 
combatants into society.
Step 4: Development of a new national police service 
who will be trained and assisted by UN.
Step 5: Security Sector Reform Unit will work with 
national authorities to reform the security services 
into a cohesive and trusted force.
Step 6
• Reconstruction of Rule of Law Institutions 
including courts, police stations, prisons.
Figure 4: Re-establishment of Security & Rule of Law Process (United Nations 2011) 
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• Observational Missions 
In these missions, peacekeepers, typically unarmed, comprise small contingents of military or 
civilian personnel, who must observe and oversee cease-fires, troop withdrawals, or other con-
ditions outlined in a ceasefire agreement. Because observation missions occur after a peace 
agreement has already been signed, and the transition of conflict is already in the process of 
being fully implemented, these types of missions are generally present a far lower risk and far 
less danger to peacekeepers. As opposed to a mission in which peacekeepers entered an active 
conflict zone, for example.  
• Inter-positional Missions 
Inter-positional peacekeeping missions can be interpreted as ‘traditional’ peacekeeping mis-
sions. Whereby, lightly armed peacekeepers, which comprise medium to large scale contingents 
of troops, act as a buffer between belligerent factions in the aftermath of a conflict. This is 
the stage where a conflict zone is still settling down before implementations for the transition 
of conflict to peace are made. Therefore, dangers such as hostile local militia, insurgents, or 
remnants of the offensive strategies such hostile forces employed, may still be present, such 
as IEDs, which poses a particularly dangerous threat to peacekeepers in the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). 
• Multidimensional Missions 
Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are conducted by military and police personnel and 
are somewhat of a hybrid between observational and inter-positional type peacekeeping mis-
sions. As well as the tasks of observational and inter-positional peacekeeping missions, military 
and police personnel also conduct more ‘multi-dimensional’ tasks, which include “electoral 
supervision, police and security forces reformations, institution building – such as courts or 
police stations. Examples of such missions include UNTAG in Namibia and ONUSAL in El Salvador.  
• Peace-Enforcement Missions 
Peace enforcement missions comprise both civilian and military personnel to comprise a large 
and well-equipped military force. The mandates of these missions authorise peacekeepers to 
use offensive force. Offensive force is authorised because these types of missions are the most 
dangerous – whereby peace is enforced largely through offensive means. The NATO operations 
in Bosnia during the break-up of Yugoslavia conducted by the NATO Implementation Force 
(IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) are examples of peace enforcement missions in which 
force is required. These types of missions are different from UN peacekeeping missions, but the 
threats present to peacekeepers, such as small arms fire which still remains the single biggest 
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killer of UN peacekeepers, although perhaps to a lesser extent in UN peacekeeping missions, 
remain the same. 
In the United Nations report Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017), Cusim-
ano, Phillips and Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, provide insight 
into the level of threats and consequential casualties in modern UN peacekeeping operations. 
They say, “since 1948, more than 3,500 personnel have lost their lives serving in United Nations 
peace operations with 943 due to acts of violence” (2017), as written in the executive summary 
of the report. There are lots of potential dangers present in peacekeeping missions, though 
more so in type four peace enforcement missions. Dangers arise mostly due to the threat of 
violence from hostile forces in operation areas. For example, the bases of peacekeeping organ-
izations deployed in an operational area can be attacked – as recently was the case in the UN 
MONUSCO mission, for example, when, “at the end of 2017 militants attacked a UN base in the 
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo” – killing fifteen peacekeepers, “the highest single death 
toll from an attack on a UN peacekeeping mission since Somalia in 1993”, writes Lisa Sharland 
of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in the 2018 article, Security of UN Peacekeepers: the 
Minefield of Politics, People and Principles. Sharland also writes in the article that “small arms 
and improvised explosive devices being used in the vast majority of fatal attacks in recent 
years”, supporting that terrorists and other such violent extremists now present in the modern 
peacekeeping environment now launch attacks against peacekeepers.  
Although, while terrorists and extremists can choose peacekeepers specifically as a target and 
attack them directly, as was the case when a UN base in the Democratic Republic of Congo was 
attacked in 2017, casualties are often civilians too. It often appears in dangerous environments 
in which peacekeepers operate, such as in the UNAMA mission in Afghanistan, that both peace-
keeper or civilian casualties occur as a result of a ‘crossfire’ of attacks or threats against either 
one of these parties, although often leading to casualties both peacekeeper and civilian. In the 
case of suicide IEDs, detonated using a vehicle or vest, for example, the explosion of which 
does not discriminate against civilian or peacekeeper.  
This is particularly evident in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mis-
sion in Mali (MINUSMA), the UN peacekeeping mission with the “highest fatality numbers due to 
IEDs, with the majority occurring during convoy operations”, according to Cruz, Cusimano and 
Phillips in “Issue 11 – Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation” in the report ‘Im-
proving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017, 26). They also say, “the frequency of 
attacks and quantity of explosives used in IEDs have increased and emplacement methods have 
increased” and that “these trends will likely worsen in the future” (2017, 26). There have been 
extremely high levels of UN casualties and fatalities in Mali since MINUSMA commenced in 2013, 
now at a total of “208” as of 31 December 2019 as mentioned on the UN’s official “total fatal-
ities since 1948” list on their website. MINUSMA, as the current peacekeeping mission with the 
 27 
 
highest number of IED casualties, many fatalities of the 208 recorded fatalities were from IEDs. 
In fact, according to the UN Secretary General’s report of the situation in Mali, (2018), in the 
three-month reporting period between October and December 2018 alone, “48 incidents in-
volving the use of improvised explosive devices were recorded” (2018, 6), point 27 of the Sec-
retary’s General’s attack reports. 
For the total, however, since January 2018, the Secretary General in the report says this: “The 
number of improvised explosive device incidents since January 2018 continued to increase, with 
192 incidents having occurred, compared to 124 incidents during the same period in 2017”. 
Regarding an attack on a MINUSMA base in Ber, Timbuktu region on 27 October, he says this 
“two vehicles filled with explosives entered the camp, where one of them exploded. The attack 
resulted in two peacekeepers killed in action and eleven injured”. Figure 5 below, from the 
report Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017) illustrates the high threat of 
base attacks between 2013 and 2013, at a total of 65 UN fatalities due to attacks on camp or 
positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 6 below illustrates, also from the report Improving Security of United Nations Peace-
keepers (2017), while small arms fire is still the single biggest killer of UN peacekeepers, IEDs 
are nevertheless, the second biggest contributor to peacekeeper fatalities, causing a total of 
43 peacekeeper deaths between the years 2013 and 2017. While in the MINUSMA mission, IEDs 
are becoming an even greater threat. As the UN Secretary General reports on the MINUSMA 
mission, on the same day as the base attack, “a MINUSMA vehicle (was) struck (by) an impro-
vised explosive device or mine, followed by an armed confrontation with an alleged violent 
extremist group. The attack resulted in the wounding of six peacekeepers”. The Secretary Gen-
eral continues to list a number of IED related attacks in the report, emphasising how the in-
creased in today’s peacekeeping environment there is an increased level of danger to 
Figure 5: 2013 – 2013 Activities versus Number of Fatalities (Cruz, Phillips, Cusimano 2017, 7) 
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peacekeepers on operations from evolved threats – increasing the need of advanced technology 
in information systems used on operations to mitigate these threats through situational aware-
ness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: 2013 – 2017 Weapons versus Numbers of Fatalities (Cruz, Phillips, Cusimano 2017, 7) 
Figure 7: 2013 – 2017 Number of Fatalities by Mission (Cruz, Phillips, Cusimano 2017, 8) 
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2.2.1 How Peacekeeping Information Systems Mitigate Peacekeeper Threats and Contributes 
Towards Peacekeeper Security 
In looking at Figure 7 above, representing the total number of deaths between the yeas 2013 
and 2017 by mission type, it is evident due to the fact that the MINUSMA mission has the highest 
number of peacekeeper fatalities than any other mission, at 91, that the high level of IED 
related casualties in the MINUSMA mission is the main contributor to this statistic. The modern 
peacekeeping environment poses many new threats to peacekeepers, which were not present 
in the past peacekeeping operations since until the end of the twentieth century. Consequen-
tially, the need for information systems to provide security to peacekeepers, largely achieved 
through delivering situational awareness, has never been higher. The increased level of threat 
to peacekeepers and the increased need for information systems to deliver security, is reflected 
through the significant increases of peacekeeper casualties since 2013. Evident by how Lieu-
tenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, a former force commander of the UN 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) as well as 
the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), says “casualties have spiked” (2017.) 
In fact, emphasising the increased level of danger to peacekeepers and how threats have 
evolved in the modern peacekeeping environment, Cusimano, Cruz and Phillips (2017) also say 
that during the five-year period between 2013 and 2017, “195 personnel in United Nations 
peacekeeping missions have been killed by acts of violence”, which they also say, is “more than 
during any five-year period in history”.  Examples of threats which have contributed to the rise 
in peacekeeper casualties include “armed groups, terrorists, organised crime, street gangs, 
criminal and political exploitation, and other threats” (2017). Unpredictable and highly dan-
gerous threats to peacekeepers such as these, reflect the importance and need for information 
systems to be able to provide situational awareness, for example, from SATCOM. As well as the 
ability for information systems to receive situational awareness, obtained from peacekeeper 
patrols in operational environments. For strategies and orders from Command & Control to be 
issued, enabling for the mitigation of threats in an operational environment. Threat mitigation 
could mean, for example, advising a patrol of UN peacekeepers to stay clear of an area known 
for hostile activity. In utilising the five basic information system functions of: input, storage, 
processing, output, and feedback loop, there are various ways information systems mitigate 
threats and deliver situational awareness and security to protect peacekeepers. 
2.2.2 Threat Identification 
Arguably the most effective security benefit that information systems can provide, is Threat 
Identification. There are various ways in which an information system can detect threats, such 
as satellite imagery and other such forms of monitoring and surveillance technology, or security 
cameras and other such devices connected to an information system. As is mentioned by Lieu-
tenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, one of his recommendations for the 
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report of Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017), under the heading; “de-
fensive posture”, he mentions that threat identification is crucial and necessary to “neutralise 
or eliminate threats”. The ways in which threat identification as well as the means of doing so, 
including through satellite and UAV (Unmanned Air Vehicles), will be discussed throughout this 
paper as well as in the Deployable Communications Analysis as not only a basic requirement of 
information systems in the modern peacekeeping environment, but also as one of the most 
crucial and effective means an information system, in combination with the human component 
of the system, has in contributing towards peacekeeper security.  
2.2.3 Advanced technology  
Advanced technology refers in this thesis to both the technological infrastructure of an infor-
mation system, as well as the devices and equipment connected to an information system. 
Advanced technology is fundamental in enabling peacekeeping organizations to obtain situa-
tional awareness and intelligence. Without advanced information system technology, however, 
to deliver situational awareness and intelligence, such as satellite communications (SATCOM) 
(which is also heavily relied upon for threat identification) these critical types of information 
could be unobtainable and peacekeeping operations would be much riskier for peacekeepers. 
In addition to enhanced situational awareness and intelligence capabilities, advanced technol-
ogy enables command and control elements in peacekeeping organizations to enact military 
strategies and enhance their overall offensive and defensive capabilities against enemy forces 
and threats. An example of this, can again be seen in the report “Improving Security of United 
Nations Peacekeepers”, also under the recommendation of “defensive posture”, where Lt Gen-
eral Carlos Alberto says UN peacekeepers should “push combat to the night, to take advantage 
of their superior technology” (2017) (in peacekeeping missions where use of force is required, 
such as peace enforcement missions). Because, when advanced technology (most of which is 
connected to the information system of a peacekeeping organization, such as the UN Modular 
Command Centre) enables use of tactics and strategies such as night combat and operations, 
which enemy forces do not possess the technological capacity to effectively conduct, peace-
keepers have the advantage over their adversaries. Whereby, active and offensive strategies 
such as this, prevent “freedom to hostile forces to decide when, where and how to attack” 
(Cruz, Phillips, Cusimano 2017) peacekeeping forces.  
2.2.4 Interoperability 
In today’s computer-driven world that produces “2.5 quintillion bytes of data everyday”, ac-
cording to Bernard Marr of Forbes Magazine in the 2018 article, ‘How Much Data Do We Create 
Every Day?’. And it is because of the fact that today’s world is so computer driven that the 
term ‘interoperability’ is such a widely applicable concept in today’s computer driven world. 
Because of this, there is no singular and universally agreed upon definition. A basic definition, 
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however, as defined by Merriam-Webster, is the “ability of a system to work with or use the 
parts of another system”, which in the context of peacekeeping information systems, means 
the ability of parts of an information to exchange data with either a different part of the same 
information systems, or with another information system. This can be classified as internal 
interoperability and external interoperability. Interoperability can be achieved through various 
communication methods, including Wide Area Networks (WAN) and Local Area (LAN) Internet 
Protocol (IP) networks, as will later be seen in the case analysis of the NATO DCIS. There are 
various benefits to interoperability of information systems during a peacekeeping operation 
which will be discussed below. 
External Interoperability of an organization 's information system with the information systems 
of other organizations, and vice versa can be crucial on operations, and can greatly contribute 
towards peacekeeper security. Particularly as current peacekeeping operations include multi-
ple different UN member nations. If a system is interoperable with other systems during oper-
ations, organizations can have one shared common operational picture displayed on their in-
formation system. And there is a common platform which organizations can use to share and 
receive the same information with each-other, in the same format. This enhanced accuracy of 
shared information through a common system and format, leads onto the benefit of enhanced 
situational awareness and situational understanding. The relationship between interoperabil-
ity, Situational Awareness (SA) and Situational Understanding (SU) will later be discussed in this 
chapter. Preceding how SA and SU contribute to peacekeeper security in the next chapter. 
Depending on the type of information peacekeepers of an organization such as NATO is sharing 
with another organization such as the UN, there is the potential to enhance SA and SU through 
interoperability. Whereby, if NATO peacekeepers, for example, send real-time information 
from an operational environment to a universal and interoperable platform between NATO and 
the UN, whereby the UN can receive and analyze the information instantaneously, without the 
information having to pass through other systems before reaching them. Because not only is 
time saved which increases the chance of the information received being more up to date, 
accurate, and reliable, which therefore enhances the quality of the SA being received, but it 
also guarantees that the UN peacekeepers and UN Command & Control elements will receive 
exactly the same information as was sent by the NATO peacekeepers in the field.  
The ability for organizations on joint peacekeeping operations to share and receive accurate 
and direct information from the same reliable sources, in the same place is crucially beneficial 
also in speeding up the process of completing mission objectives. Because, as is the case by 
how in crises, “there is a lot of information available from different sources” (Kallio 2017). 
And, as often happens in these situations, “communication systems are not able to provide this 
information (from different sources) in an organised way” (Kallio 2017). Creating a delay in not 
only the receiving of information, but also the processing and understanding of information 
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which hinders the ability to plan and enact peacekeeping operations. Which again, provides far 
more accurate situational understanding and situational awareness, which will now be dis-
cussed why situational awareness and understanding contributes to peacekeeper security in the 
following chapter. 
Another benefit of external interoperability through a common information sharing platform, 
is that all peacekeeping organizations and stakeholders in an operational area, such as NGOs, 
have access to the same information. As opposed to having different access privileges to certain 
information, which could occur because data in one organization ’s information system could 
have been given a different security classification than in another organization ’s system, or 
because of differing access controls to shared information. In preventing this obstacle to cre-
ating an accurate and cohesive common operational picture and understanding, through in-
teroperability and enhanced cooperation, a greater Situational Understanding, collectively 
speaking in terms of all friendly forces in an operational area. Which is crucial to mission suc-
cess.  
Because, as Kallio agrees, in the paper ‘Peace Operations: Supporting Efficiency by Organiza-
tion’, “access to information is an essential factor in reaching the strategic objectives” (Kallio 
2017) and information that is shared and received “can be utilized only if it is accessible” (Kallio 
2017). Therefore, as previously stated and as Kallio also agrees when he says “the stakeholders 
should form an information network enabling the information to reach the end-users” (Kallio 
2017), interoperability should be achieved through an interoperable and common information 
sharing network or platform between organizations on joint peacekeeping operations. Because 
in doing so, there is a stronger and more effective joint ability to “contribute(s) to a situational 
understanding and to reaching the objectives” (Kallio 2017), because “when stakeholders are 
within an information sharing community, they have access to contributing to the operation as 
well as sharing their information and resources” (Kallio 2017).  
This benefit of enhanced cooperation and mission planning through interoperability includes 
the additional benefit of a stronger ability for Command and Control elements to have the 
necessary information to act upon in making decisions to avert threats and enhance peace-
keeper security. Of which the information sharing of the/ decisions themselves can also be 
achieved more efficiently through an interoperable system, as will shortly be discussed in the 
benefits Regarding internal interoperability. Additionally, when peacekeeping objectives are 
being met, such as objective 1 of Figure 4, Chapter 2.2.1 Peacekeeping Threats, of the UN Mine 
Action Service to clear left over landmines and unexploded bombs, it means the mission is 
progressing towards the overall objective of all peacekeeping missions. Which is, as stated by 
the UN on the ‘Peacekeeping’ section of their website, the “transition from conflict to peace”, 
whereby after this transition is complete, there is less danger not only to the civilians and local 
population, but also of the peacekeepers. Because, again referring to Figure 4, Chapter 2.2.1 
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Peacekeeping Threats, as seen in step six in which rule of law and law establishments and 
security services have been re-created, threats previously present to civilians and peacekeep-
ers, such as terrorists and the consequent IEDs they lay, as was the case in Afghanistan, can 
now be apprehended and removed. As has been the case in Afghanistan when the British Army 
as other British Armed Forces ceased all combat operations in Afghanistan leaving in 2014, 
handing over control to the Afghan police and allowing the sub sequential United Nations Assis-
tance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to take effect.  
In achieving external interoperability by having two or more parties which can communicate 
with each-other through a shared information system, there is another joint cooperation ben-
efit in which the peacekeeping organizations working together on a peacekeeping operation 
can more effectively work with each-other and cooperate to meet mission objectives. Which is 
another reason why interoperability in joint peacekeeping operations and between UN attach-
ment forces is imperative in allowing them to plan, cooperate and conduct operations more 
effectively through using the same information systems and communicating with the same tech-
nology and information sharing networks and platforms. “Joint planning, as well as implement-
ing and evaluating actions, will enhance the level of understanding of strategic objectives. 
Therefore, information is needed to reach a holistic approach and more efficiently perform as 
one” (Kallio 2017). Because cooperation and shared communication platforms not only allow 
an increased ability to complete mission objectives, but also to share situational awareness, 
crucial for peacekeeper security. 
Regarding Internal Interoperability, it is when the parts and components of an information sys-
tem of one organization ’s information system are connected so that data can be shared, re-
ceived, and stored throughout an information. Internal interoperability of an organization ’s 
information system, as will be discussed later in the Deployable Communications Analysis, 
Chapter five of this thesis, particularly in analyzing the WAN and LAN IP networks of the inter-
connected Wide Area Service Provision (WASP) vehicles of the British Army’s BAE FALCON in-
formation system, is crucial in allowing information to effectively flow between the peace-
keepers in an operational environment and the C2 element of an information system. As seen 
in Lawson’s Model of Command and Control, allowing situational awareness to be received by 
a commander to provide situational understanding, which further allows for the commander to 
issue orders back down the chain of command and through the information system before reach-
ing peacekeepers in the field. These orders and information provided by commanders can ena-
ble them to avert from any potential threats in an operational environment. And the decisions 
made from situational understanding of a commander may not only have come directly from 
the situational awareness of peacekeepers themselves, but from other means in an information 
system achieved through advanced technology, such as monitoring and surveillance technology  
such as satellites or UAVs, capable of taking extremely high zoom and resolution images which 
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can provide intelligence and awareness to threats present to peacekeepers in an operational 
environment, such as the locations of enemy forces.  
2.2.5 Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness (SA), as defined by Endsley in Design & Evaluation for Situation Awareness 
Enhancement (1988), defines situation awareness as “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the 
projection of their status in the near future”. It is a state in which the human factor of an 
organization has an accurate, up to date, and often real time perception of the events unfolding 
in an operational environment, and around one’s forces. The importance of SA in providing 
peacekeeper security lies in the fact that without it, C2 elements who rely on information 
systems to obtain SA of their forces and of the state of an environment (of which they can enact 
Lawsons’ Model of Command & Control if the environmental state is not as is desired) as well 
real-time SA transmitted by ground forces to an information system, which acts as a medium 
between forces and C2 elements, commanders would not have accurate information. Without 
accurate information about an environmental state and the situation of his/her forces, loss of 
life can occur, especially when considering the previously mentioned and extremely dangerous 
threats which are now rife in the modern peacekeeping environment.  
Situational awareness is a form of tactical intelligence, which Cruz, Cusimano and Phillips 
(2017) emphasize the crucial need for in peacekeeping operations, to improve peacekeeper 
security. Under “Issue 13- Intelligence for The Security of Peacekeeping Personnel” (issues in 
the report referring to current problems in the way UN peacekeeping missions are being con-
ducted, which are causes of peacekeeper casualties and fatalities), they say that “A lack of 
tactical intelligence prevents leadership and personnel from detecting, avoiding, and counter-
ing threats” (2017, 28). The best example to demonstrate the importance of Situational Aware-
ness, and the effectiveness it can have in providing peacekeeper security, when effectively 
delivered, are communication networks. While communications networks are not strictly infor-
mation systems themselves, in the sense of the information systems used to support operations 
with an attached C2 element, examples of real communication networks that have been used 
by peacekeeping forces on operations will be used to demonstrate exactly how SA is important, 
and why the information systems that are used by peacekeeping organizations as their primary 
information management assets on operations, must be capable of delivering SA.  
Interoperability is crucial for SA to be shared on communications networks and received by 
other organizations. Because interoperability between peacekeeping organizations in an oper-
ational area allows for all friendly forces to communicate and constantly be connected with 
each other, sharing SA over one single network. Because interoperability means that the real 
time information inputted into an information system, can also be shared simultaneously to 
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other organizations, alerting all branches of a single organization, as well as other organizations 
of threats in an environment.  
In Afghanistan, the particular threat that demanded such an SA capability to counter it and 
protect peacekeepers, was IEDs, laid on roads by insurgents. For this particular threat, accord-
ing to Henry S. Kenyon in Chapter 2 “NATO Deploys Command and Control Tool in Afghanistan” 
of the Multinational Operations Newsletter (2009) TIDE featured a "planning and deconfliction 
capability that permits convoys to plan around traffic jams", whereby convoys could alert other 
convoys in the area of potential threats in the local area, and advise which roads not to travel 
on when there was traffic. Because high traffic is risky in that it increases the chance of ambush 
or being attacked, or for insurgents to lay an IED. But TIDE therefore decreased the threat of 
being attacked by insurgents, therefore contributing towards peacekeeper security. 
The network, CAVNET (Communications Against Violence Network), enabled users to "enter 
situational data into the network to alert other groups operating in the area" (Kenyon 2009), 
enabling them to plan around a situation before entering it unknowingly. Thus, preventing cas-
ualties that would result from threats present in an operational environment, which would 
otherwise be much harder to avoid without the constant communication flow between coalition 
forces, achieved by CAVNET. Again, demonstrating the importance of interoperability in an 
information system. It can also be noted that CAVNET, was also a form of monitoring technol-
ogy, where instead of having monitoring technology to alert of imminent threats, it was the 
soldiers themselves alerting of imminent threats by inputting data into the network to keep 
other friendly forces in area safe. 
The screenshot from CAVNET below, Figure 8, is obtained from a PBS FRONTLINE article called 
Innovating and Improvising (2005), which featured a Q & A with the founder of CAVNET Maj. 
Patrick Michaelis. It illustrates how an interoperable network is not only a crucial part of an 
individual organization 's information system, but how in connecting multiple organizations, it 
can form one giant, interoperable collaborative information for joint peacekeeping operations. 
The various capabilities of the network to increase Situational Awareness, interoperability, and 
operational safety and security to peacekeepers in the field are listed on the left column, such 
as "IED HUNTER", "IED REDUCTION" and "FOB Security" (Forward Operating Base). 
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The following are examples of how the situational awareness capabilities of CAVNET have been 
used in Iraq to enhance security, according to the founder of CAVNET Maj. Patrick Michaelis. 
They testify to the importance of shared, interoperable communication networks in contrib-
uting to security through providing enhanced situational awareness and situational understand-
ing. This importance is demonstrated by actively averting threats and danger. 
• “A scout platoon leader -- in this case the scout platoon leader from 1-8 Cav. -- was 
given the mission to conduct sniper operations. He had never really executed a mission 
like it before. He looked on the CAVNET, where a commander from 1-9 Cav, in another 
part of the city, had posted notes and TTPs from employment of snipers over the past 
months. The Scout Platoon Leader from 1-8 was able to integrate what he had read 
from the CAVNET into his planning, preparation, and execution cycle. 
• “A leader posts a report that his unit experienced an IED that was cloaked by a poster 
of Moqtada al-Sadr. On the other side of the city, a commander taps into the CAVNET 
and reads the post. Though he is in another part of the city, he has been involved in 
operations that require removing posters posted on IIG (Iraqi interim government) pro-
jects. He briefs up his leaders before they execute a normal combat patrol. One sees a 
poster that mirrors the description given by the original post. Instead of ripping it down, 
he calls EOD [Explosive Ordinance Disposal], who discovers that it is rigged as an IED” 
Figure 8: CAVNET Screenshot (PBS, 2005) 
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2.2.6 Situational Awareness Collection Methods: Field Assessments 
Field assessments, is something particularly the UN, will conduct before arrival to an opera-
tional environment. Field assessments, more commonly referred to as ‘baseline assessments’ 
in the UN, provide information about an operational environment, including demographics, 
weather, and geography. This geographical and demographical information can be collected, 
stored, and shared in an information system. The BAE FALCON, being an excellent example of 
an information system that achieves this process via satellite photography, transmitting data 
and photographs to ground connected ground stations. Field assessments are critical in provid-
ing Situational Intelligence that not only allows peacekeepers to be appropriately equipped and 
prepared to conduct their mission, but also creates security and protection. Because if peace-
keepers are adequately equipped and prepared and aware of potential threats, they can more 
effectively counter them.  
2.2.7 Situational Awareness Collection Methods: Sampling 
Sampling, a practice conducted primarily by the UN to gather information about an operational 
environment, contributes towards operational security because it enables peacekeepers to lo-
gistically prepare before deploying in an environment. Therefore, minimising the chances of 
peacekeepers not being properly equipped or prepared to deal with threats which may be pre-
sent on the ground. Intelligence about an operational area allows an organization  to be logis-
tically prepared, which is particularly relevant, given how, again referring to Lieutenant Gen-
eral Carlos Alberto Santos Cruz’ report “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers”, 
under the recommendation of “Operational Behaviour”, “each mission is unique, and even 
within each country, different situations require different actions given the threat that prevails 
in an area” (Cruz, Phillips, Cusimano 2017). Therefore, sampling, largely achieved through col-
lection, storage and sharing capabilities of information systems, is a critical activity for threat 
mitigation - enhancing the security and safety of peacekeepers  
UNITAR, exemplifies how information systems are used to conduct field assessments, with their 
Operational Satellite Applications Programme – UNOSAT. Demonstrating similar imagery and 
data collection as is present in the British Army’s BAE FALCON information system, which will 
later be discussed, UNOSAT’s “Humanitarian Rapid Mapping Service”, according to UN-SPIDER 
(United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response), delivers "imagery analysis and satellite solutions" which is an effective method of 
conducting geographical and landscape assessments to better help peacekeepers understand 
the environment they will be operating in, which is crucial for logistical preparedness and 
providing peacekeepers with the correct equipment to conduct their operation and enhance 
peacekeeper security. And to quote Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos 
Cruz, former commander of MINUSTAH in Haiti and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, “Nobody attacks a stronger opponent”, as said in the 2017 report, Improving Security 
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of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017). And in the same report, one of the most important 
recommendations for improving peacekeeper security is that “troops should not be deployed 
without the necessary and appropriate equipment in the threat environment. Inadequate or 
missing equipment facilitates and increases the number of casualties”. Again, emphasizing that 
gathering intelligence about an operational environment is a crucial activity. 
Furthermore, UNOSAT provides such solutions to "relief and development organizations within 
and outside of the UN system" (UN SPIDER), demonstrating the importance of interoperability 
between stakeholders involved in peacekeeping operations. Especially regarding those such as 
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), who may not have the IS technological capabilities for 
obtaining such data themselves. Therefore, exemplifying how activities like field assessments, 
achieved through information systems, can enhance not only the security and safety a single 
organizations’ peacekeepers, but of many. 
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3 Information Security 
While modern information systems used by peacekeeping organizations must be capable of pro-
tecting peacekeepers against the dangers and threats in today’s peacekeeping environments, 
there must also be measures to deal with the cyber threats against the information systems 
themselves. Because if the information systems used by peacekeeping organizations are com-
promised, the security created by information systems during peacekeeping operations, and 
therefore the safety of peacekeepers, may also be compromised. To deter and protect against 
the various threats posed to information systems, an information system must have robust in-
formation security measures in place.  
There are various definitions of the term information security’, also known as ‘InfoSec’. How-
ever, it is generally agreed upon by information security experts, to be the practice of protect-
ing information - by mitigating information risks, through a set of practices and tools deployed 
by an organization, to protect sensitive information. Information, particularly in the context of 
information systems, is referred to more commonly as ‘data’, however. In an information sys-
tem, the set of practices that protect an organization ’s information, are largely in the form of 
access controls, which prevent unauthorised personnel from entering or accessing a system. 
Access controls, although a critical form of information security, are only, however, a category 
of the larger information security practice of information security controls, which are the over-
all crucial enablers for the detection and remediation of security breaches. In addition to in-
formation security controls, information assurance is another one of the most integral infor-
mation security practices. Information assurance is the practice of ensuring the continuity of 
information confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). 
3.1 Information Security Threats 
There are many different forms of threats to information security. Including software attacks, 
theft of intellectual property, theft of equipment or information, sabotage, and information 
extortion. Regarding software attacks, today there are countless forms of software attacks, 
though some of the most common ones are viruses, worms, phishing attacks and trojan horses.  
Data Integrity is another form of information security, in that integrity of the data can ensure 
the data or information security. The Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) is one of 
the biggest standardization, education and resource platforms dedicated to the fields of data 
and information security. According to them, Data Integrity “refers to the validity of data”. 
Data Integrity can be compromised for various reasons. Which, as EDRM says, include: “human 
errors when data is entered, errors that occur when data is transmitted from one computer to 
another, software bugs or viruses, hardware malfunctions such as disk crashes, and natural 
disasters such as fires and floods”. These threats to information security can be managed and 
mitigated through security controls, which will be discussed in more detail later. There are 
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different types of information security controls which are designed to mitigate specific threats. 
For example, physical controls mitigate the risk of data assets succumbing to natural disasters 
such as fires and floods. 
One of the biggest reasons why data can be compromised and its integrity undermined, as in 
some of these ways listed by EDRM, is because the devices used to store data (data storage 
devices), are tangible, physical assets. Or are formed by an infrastructure of physical devices. 
For instance, ‘the cloud’, which relies upon vast databases comprising of large amounts of 
servers. Regarding the ways the above causes can compromise Data Integrity, they include 
“modification, disruption, destruction, and inspection” – the things Information Security prac-
tices are designed to prevent, according to CISCO, one of North America’s biggest technology 
conglomerates. For example, if a virus infected a computer, its data could be subject to any 
one of these methods of data being compromised. 
3.2 Protective Measures 
To ensure operational security is not compromised, every component in the technological in-
frastructure of an information system, must have information security measures in place to 
ensure the overall information security of an information system is secure and protected against 
threats. The information shared in information systems used by peacekeeping organizations can 
be extremely sensitive, for example, information relating to operational intelligence, situa-
tional awareness, or mission objectives during peacekeeping operations. If such information 
was to be compromised, operational security, and therefore the safety of the peacekeepers is 
also put at risk of being compromised. Therefore, it is imperative that peacekeeping organiza-
tions have robust information security measures employed in their information systems.  
3.2.1 Security Controls  
Security controls are measures deployed by an organization to “reduce or mitigate risk” (Walk-
owski 2019). Risk mitigation in the context of security controls, refers to risk mitigation of an 
organization ’s assets. The most crucial asset to an organization in the context of information 
systems, is the data itself, managed by an organization ’s assets. There are various ways secu-
rity controls can be implemented, including any type of “policy, procedure, technique, method, 
solution, plan, action, or device” (Walkowski 2019) designed to achieve the objective of secu-
rity controls – reducing or mitigating risk to an organization ’s assets.  
There are three types of security controls: physical, technical, administrative. These control 
types can have three control functions: preventing, detecting, and correcting. Preventive con-
trols are arguably the most important of the control functions, as their purpose is to prevent 
security incidents from happening – thus preventing any form of asset damage or loss, as well 
as financial loss. Detective controls and corrective controls on the other hand, have the purpose 
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of managing incidents while they are in the process of happening, or after they have happened, 
to try and prevent any imminent or further asset damage or loss. 
Regarding the other two control functions, detective controls refer to measures taken to “de-
tect and alert to unwanted or unauthorised activity in progress or after it has occurred” (Walk-
owski 2019) allowing for a counteractive response to be made and measures for recovery to be 
implemented at the soonest possible time. On the other hand, corrective controls function 
after a security incident has happened and are intended to “repair damage or restore resources 
and capabilities to their prior state following an unauthorised or unwanted activity” (Walkowski 
2019), thus remedying the incident. And in the context of peacekeeping, corrective controls 
would ensure the CIA of information in an information system, as well as the continuity of any 
information system functions which may have been impaired or compromised as a result of a 
security incident or breach. Therefore, after the successful implementation of corrective con-
trols, full functionality, and the ability of an information system to contribute towards peace-
keeper security would be fully restored.  
Concerning the types of security controls themselves, administrative controls are intended to 
control or change the behaviour of personnel or employees in an organization to lessen the 
chance of any security breaches or information security incidents occurring through human 
error. They are “policies, procedures or guidelines that define personnel or business practices 
in accordance with the organizations’ security goals” (Walkowski 2019). These policies and 
procedures can apply to many things, including “equipment and internet usage, physical access 
to facilities, separation of duties, data classification and auditing” (Walkowski 2019). Adminis-
trative controls are important because they shape the behaviour of an organization ’s employ-
ees or personnel in a way that makes them more aware and knowledgeable of information 
security. Thus, making information security incidents or breaches from the internal perspective 
of an organization, less likely to happen. 
With respect to technical controls, they are the measures enacted by the network infrastruc-
ture and technological components of an organization ’s information system, including “hard-
ware or software mechanisms” (Walkowski 2019). Measures include “authentication solutions, 
firewalls, antivirus software, intrusion detections systems (IDSs), intrusion protections systems 
(IPSs), constrained interfaces, as well as access control lists (ACLs) and encryption measures” 
(Walkowski 2019). Also included as technical controls, as written in the 2012 IGI Global book 
“Grid and Cloud Computing: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications” (2012), are “im-
plementing and maintaining access control mechanisms”, “password and resource manage-
ment”, and “security devices”. Technical controls are important because they strengthen the 
security of an organization ’s technological and network infrastructure, thus lessening the 
chance of an external security incident or breach. 
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Regarding physical controls, according to YAU HK (2014) in the open access article Information 
Security Controls. Adv Robot Autom 3: e118, from the University of Hong Kong, they are 
measures to “control physical access to sensitive information and to protect the availability of 
information”. They include things such as “fences, gates, biometrics access controls, security 
lighting, CCTVs” (Walkowski 2019).  as well as “motion sensors” (Walkowski 2019). and “envi-
ronmental controls like HVAC and humidity controls” (Walkowski 2019). Physical controls are 
also a fundamental security control to ensure information security because physical security 
and information security are interconnected whereby if physical security is compromised, in-
formation security can be compromised to. For example, if an information storage facility such 
as a data centre, is not physically secure, unauthorised personnel may be able to gain access 
to that facility, thus causing a security breach and potentially an information security breach, 
with data or data assets being compromised. Physical security controls include controlling fa-
cility access, system locking (for example, by password), facility perimeter protection, intru-
sion monitoring and environmental controls.  
It must be noted that physical controls do not only extend to perimeter protection and entry 
controls, notably with the example of HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning). Whereby, 
HVAC controls ensure physical protection of data assets as well as other assets concerning the 
data assets themselves, against environmental or climate related threats to information secu-
rity, such as extreme temperatures or humidity. The housing of an information system, which 
will be discussed later, particularly in the analysis of the UN MCC, is a prime example of where 
HVAC controls are applied. 
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4 Command & Control Concepts 
An information system is an organised network or structure designed for the collection, organ-
ization, storage, and communication of information. There are five functions of an information 
system: input, storage, processing, output, and feedback loop. Two of the most acclaimed 
theoretical Command & Control models; Lawson’s Model of Command and Control, created by 
“Dr Joel S. Lawson Sr.” of the “Naval Electronic Systems Command”, as mentioned in George 
Orr’s ‘Combat Operations C3I’ (1983, 32), and U.S military strategist John Boyd’s OODA (Ob-
serve, Orient, Decide, Act) Loop, demonstrate these five functions. Specifically, how they can 
be executed in an information system. 
4.1 Lawson’s Model of Command & Control 
Figure 9, below, from the article ‘Test Design Using the OODA Loop’ (Krishnanand 2018), depicts 
Lawson's model of Command and Control. Which in the most basic interpretation, demonstrates 
how information is obtained from an environment and then processed and acted upon within a 
command centre. As is visible by the sequential chain of analyses that occur in the process of 
interpreting received information, the information or data begins by being sensed, before pro-
ceeding through the other analyses before finally being acted upon. Another way of interpreting 
the information flow of transmission and analyses depicted in this model, is that the information 
is transmitted and processed hierarchically, flowing from bottom of a command chain or organ-
izational hierarchy in an operational environment, to the top of a command chain or organiza-
tional hierarchy to the commander in a Command and Control centre.  
 
Figure 9: Lawson’s Model of Command & Control (Stanton, Baber, Walker, 2008, 209 – 220) 
Comparing the current environment state (Situational Awareness) with the desired environmen-
tal state, is how Lawson's model theoretically depicts how the information system commander 
is able to deem whether action needs to be taken, based on the information he or she receives. 
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If the current environmental state is not the same as the desired state, a decision will be made 
by the commander in the command centre, and orders will be issued which will lead to a change 
in the environmental state to make it as desired. In the context of peacekeeping, this would 
mean Command & Control issuing orders to peacekeepers in an operational area. 
4.2 The OODA Loop 
Another important command and control concept, which reflects the way peacekeeping organ-
izations process information, using their information systems as a vehicle to do so, comes from 
US Airforce Colonel and military strategist, John Boyd. He developed a concept known as the 
OODA loop, of “observation-orientation-decision-action”, as Baber, Harris & Stanton note in 
Modelling Command and Control – Event Analysis of Systematic Teamwork (2012, 16). The OODA 
loop can be regarded as a simplified version of Lawson's C2 model processes of sensing, pro-
cessing, comparing, deciding, acting, and “provides a tactical-level perspective on Command 
and Control as a Process” (2012,16). Figure 10 below illustrates the individual but sequential 
‘Observe’, ‘Orient’, ‘Decide’ and ‘Act’ processes working in sync with each other, the ideal 
order and state of decision making which represents the Command & Control (C2) process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Deployable Communications Information Systems  
Highly diverse with many operational capabilities is the concept of deployable communications 
and information systems (DCIS). They are robust, rapidly deployable information systems, de-
signed significantly around the element of Command & Control, and can be deployed in any 
environment in which a peacekeeping organization may operate. This is why they are such an 
effective asset in peacekeeping operations in which command and control as well as communi-
cations capabilities may need operational readiness and to be fully effective within a short 
period of time, to meet operational needs anywhere in the world. Such technology is currently 
being used by the UN through the Modular Command Centre, and NATO through Airbus's De-
ployable Communications Information System (DCIS).  
Figure 10: John Boyd’s OODA Loop (Krishnanand, 2018) 
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Deployable Communications Information Systems have the core purpose of communicating in-
formation. The British Armed Forces’ BAE's FALCON system exemplifies this, providing a "secure 
internet for the battlespace linking service personnel at all levels of command" (BAE Systems). 
Communication is the core purpose of all DCISs. Because in the context of peacekeeping oper-
ations, the role of the information system is to support peacekeeping missions and operations 
through managing and communicating information. Between peacekeepers in the field, head-
quarters, and ground stations deployed in the operational environment, and other domains of 
the peacekeeping organization of which are connected to the same information system network 
and where command and control elements are present. 
The three deployable communications information systems which will be analyzed in this paper 
are: the UN Modular Command Centre (UN MCC), the NATO Deployable Communications Infor-
mation System (DCIS), and the British Armed Force’s BAE FALCON. By and large, the three 
information systems are extremely similar, all functioning with a command and control compo-
nent, largely achieved through WAN (Wide Area Network) and LAN (Local Area Network) con-
nectivity. WAN and LAN capabilities are achieved in the systems primarily through standard 
internet protocol (IP) networks, which is particularly apparent in the BAE FALCON which almost 
exclusively relies upon this method of communication. Because during peacekeeping opera-
tions, internet access is perhaps the most integral part of the communications elements of an 
information system. As will be discussed, internet-based communications networks allow for 
real time information, also known as situational awareness, to be transmitted and received 
instantaneously between peacekeepers on the field, HQs stationed on the ground, and com-
mand and control elements within the organization at a remote location, such as the UNGSC, 
headquartered in Brindisi, Italy.  
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5 Deployable Communications Information Systems Analysis  
With information security in consideration, this chapter will analyze three Deployable Commu-
nication & Information Systems (DCIS), namely the NATO Deployable Communication & Infor-
mation System (DCIS), the United Nations Modular Command Centre (UN MCC) and the British 
Army’s BAE FALCON. It will be determined how and what aspects of the DCISs contribute to-
wards peacekeeper security, and whether they support Lawson’s Model of Command and Con-
trol as well as John Boyd’s OODA Loop. More so, however, the focus of the analyses will be of 
the administrative, technical, and physical information security controls of the three systems 
to ensure the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) of the information managed in the 
systems. The CIA triad analysis sections of the three individual DCIS analyses will determine 
how the information shared in these systems is protected, and therefore how the operational 
security that the systems contribute towards is maintained and not compromised.  
5.1 UN Modular Command Centre  
The UN Modular Command Centre (UN MCC) developed by the United Nations Global Service 
Centre (UNGSC), is the perfect embodiment of a Command and Control centre with C4 capabil-
ities, demonstrating how the two work in accordance with each other. A 20ft converted sea 
container, its purpose is rapid deployment, to any location, allowing to support UN peacekeep-
ing operations in hostile and remote locations, able to be fully installed and deployed within 5 
hours. Its connectivity and communications come in the form of Data Voice, VTC, standard ICT 
configuration DFS 75 (connects up to 75 users).  
Such communications technology enables clear and concise information sharing between com-
manders and peacekeepers in the field. Data Voice, VTC and DFS 75 are examples of how it is 
the communications technology aspect of an information system that is mainly responsible for 
achieving interoperability of a system, too. The technology allows commanders to instantly and 
seamlessly share real time information and logistics with each other and throughout the organ-
ization as well as connecting military, UN and civil communications systems, part of their larger 
information systems. The information and communications technologies provided by the UN 
GSC to support UN peacekeeping operations, is utilised by information systems such as the UN 
Modular Command Centre. The UN GSC is ISO14001 and ISO9001 certified, which is therefore 
an administrative control to the people who operate the UN MCC. This is an administrative 
control or the UN to ensure information security vulnerabilities are minimal.  
5.1.1 Administrative Controls  
The UN GSC trains all operators of UN MCCs to be proficient and knowledgeable in information 
security and cyber security practices. And overall information security awareness. Thus, de-
creasing the chances of information security incidents occurring due to human error and 
strengthening the overall information security of the UN MCC information system when it is 
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being operated. However, a lot of the information relating to the specifics of how the UN and 
UN agencies like the UN GSC train their personnel in the field of information security, as well 
as using systems like the UN MCC, are classified and not publicly available. It is therefore hard 
to give a more in-depth analysis of this control category. 
5.1.2 Technical Controls 
Though the UN MCC is a fully functional DCIS, due its small scale and limited technological 
capacity in comparison to other systems such as the NATO DCIS, and its heavy reliance on UN 
GSC for communication support and resources, the information security measures of the UN 
GSC will be also be analyzed. These security measures are applicable to the UN MCC, too how-
ever, because a lot of the data that is transmitted from the UN MCC to the UN GSC headquar-
ters, is operational information that may concern peacekeeper security. One of UN GSC’s tech-
nical information controls is its firewall solution, achieved through Fortinet FortiGate 100D 
Firewall. A firewall is a network security device that monitors incoming and outgoing network 
traffic. In analyzing network traffic, a firewall can detect information security threats. This 
security feature contributes towards operational by ensuring the preventing any harmful 
threats from passing through the network and damaging information CIA, which could, in turn, 
deteriorate UN GSC service provision to UN MCCs, which affect peacekeeper security by directly 
affecting the ability of MCCs to monitor missions.  
This information security measures of the UN GSC which processes information received from 
UN MCCs, contributes towards operational security of peacekeepers ‘on the ground’, because 
analysis of network traffic through a firewall enables the UN transmit information and support 
to connected MCC users, of which 75 can be connected at a given time, and “counter cyber 
security threats”, as said in the educational video “UN GSC 2018” (2019), by the UN GSC. Coun-
tering cyber security threats helps to ensure mission critical support and information reaches 
UN stations in an operational environment.  
5.1.3 Physical Controls 
Regarding physical controls, the Modular Command Centre, although not the largest in terms 
of size, being fitted in a twenty square foot metal sea container, is perhaps the most physically 
and environmentally durable deployable communication information system, currently availa-
ble. An environmental control is a form of physical control. The UN MCC’s main environmental 
control is in the form of its hard and almost impenetrable steel exterior, ensuring the infor-
mation system technology and assets housed inside are entirely protected from environmental 
threats. This tough UN MCC housing allows the UN to conduct peacekeeping operations all over 
the world, in some of the most extreme conditions, without information technology and infor-
mation security being compromised.  
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The current MINURSO mission in the Western Sahara, for example, is one of such environments 
that has extreme conditions whereby extreme heat and dust poses a threat to information 
system technology and assets. Figure 11 below, depicts typical air conditioning systems that 
keep UN MCCs ventilated. All UN MCCs are equipped with air conditioning systems to ensure 
they do not overheat and the functionality of information technology and their ability to exe-
cute tasks which ensure security during UN peacekeeping operations, is maintained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 NATO Deployable Communications Information System 
The NATO DCIS is an information system for "providing managed information and communication 
services within and between deployed command and control elements, reach back to strategic 
networks", as said in the educational video “Deployable Communication Information System 
(DCIS)” (2014) by Airbus Defence and Space. The system can achieve connectivity between HQ 
can “using multiple SATCOM, radio, fibre, or locally available public telecoms bearers"(DCIS 
2014). Methods of these types of connectivity include “telephony, video and data application 
services over a common IP network.”(DCIS 2014) The system provides "operational intelligence, 
situational awareness, operational planning and analysis, reporting and tasking, logistics, geo-
graphic information, modelling and simulation and collaboration tools"(DCIS 2014), all of which, 
especially OPINTEL and SA, are useful in providing creating an accurate picture about an oper-
ational environment and the threats it may contain, which can be used to plan and navigate 
operations in a way that mitigates the chance of peacekeeper safety being compromised by 
threats.  
One of the ways this can be achieved through compiling the different types of information listed 
above, is by creating a Common Operational Picture (COP). A COP is “a single identical display 
Figure 11: United Nations Modular Command Centre Air Conditioning Unit (United Nations 
Global Service Centre, 2017) 
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of relevant information shared by more than one command (that) facilitates collaborative plan-
ning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness”, as defined in the Department 
of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2001). Figure 12 below illustrates the 
outer structure of the easily and quickly deployable tents used to house the DCIS, while Figure 
13 illustrates an inside operating area of NATO DCIS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Deployable Communication & Information System 
(Interactive Systems & Business Consulting) 
Figure 13: Operating Equipment Inside North Atlantic Treaty Organization Deployable Commu-
nication & Information System (Defense News, 2014) 
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The ability to decide upon and alternate the fastest networks at a given time in a given location, 
greatly enhances operational and personnel security, because the speed of which data can be 
received and transmitted between the DCIS and other HQs or peacekeepers in the field, greatly 
affects the quality of the information that is received by the user of whom the information has 
been transmitted. In the context of a peacekeeping operation, high quality and useful infor-
mation is information that can be defined as ‘real time’ or situational awareness. This type of 
information allows commanders to make decisions while situations unfold, which are therefore 
more accurate decisions which can better protect the safety and security of the soldiers.  
5.2.1 Information Security Measures & Controls 
Regarding the information security measures of NATO’s DCIS, it has robust administrative, tech-
nical, and physical information security controls which help ensure the DCIS manages, is secure 
and protected against information security threats and vulnerabilities. The information security 
controls of the NATO DCIS which will be discussed below, are an integral part of the system to 
ensure information is not compromised, as well as continuity of the information system’s func-
tions, and therefore maintenance of the operational security these functions create, too.  
5.2.2 Administrative Controls 
A key theme of deployable information systems, much like NATO’s DCIS, is that they require 
minimal training on behalf of the personnel who operate them. In accordance with the nature 
and purpose of administrative information security controls, minimal training, and ease of use 
of an information system lessens the chances of information security incidents occurring due to 
human error. When a system like the NATO DCIS is easy to use by NATO personnel, it means the 
chances of human error caused by mistakes when using one of the five components of an infor-
mation system, as a consequence of having sufficient knowledge of how to use it, are signifi-
cantly reduced.  
This is a crucial benefit, because if personnel do not have a sufficient understanding of how to 
use one of the five components of the DCIS, such as the computer software component of the 
system, which can often be the most difficult component of the system to fully understand and 
correctly learn how to use, the consequential increased likelihood of human error, can cause 
negative consequences to both the information security of the information system, and there-
fore also jeopardise the operational security that the NATO DCIS creates for the NATO peace-
keepers who are dependent on it for their operational security and safety.  
One of the key reasons as to why information security incidents caused by human error can 
negatively affect information security and operational security, is because, depending on the 
type and severity of the information security incident that has occurred, the entire efficiency 
of the information system can be affected. Because, when information security incidents occur 
through incorrect use of one of the five information system components, due to human error, 
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the five functions of the system which are interconnected to the five components the infor-
mation system are also negatively affected.  
And if the efficiency of a system to execute its functions, such as data output, is not as efficient 
as it is supposed to be, the roles of the information system, such as the communication of 
information – one of the most crucial elements of an information system in creating operational 
security during peacekeeping operations, could be jeopardised. In this event, situational aware-
ness data may not be able to be transmitted from peacekeepers to HQ in a volatile situation, 
or vice versa. And the command and control elements of the system would not possess the 
required information to make decisions which affect the lives and safety of peacekeepers – 
which is detrimental to the security of the peacekeepers in the field. Another example is if a 
skill-based error occurred because a user made small but consistent mistakes in using software 
of the system, an information security incident could occur through sensitive information unin-
tentionally being sent to unintended recipients. This same scenario could also occur because 
of a decision based-error – which is also more likely to occur when a system is more complex. 
To conclude the NATO DCIS information security control of ease of use of the system, the ad-
ministrative control of minimal training required to operate the system, significantly reduces 
the likelihood of information security incidents occurring because of human error. And there-
fore, the overall information security of the information system is enhanced, in turn enhancing 
the operational and personnel security of the peacekeepers who are dependent on the DCIS to 
share and receive mission critical information, by ensuring continuity and efficiency of the DCIS 
in executing its functions that enable users to share and receive information. 
5.2.3 Technical Controls 
A technical control of the NATO DCIS that affects operational and personnel security rather 
than information security, is the DCIS’s throughput interface and monitoring system. Basically 
defined, throughput, in the context of the communications networks of the DCIS, as written in 
the article Bandwidth Vs Throughput (2014) by Jartinez Boston, published on AvaLAN Wireless, 
is the “rate of successful message delivery over a communication channel”. Throughput is usu-
ally measured in bits per second (bit/s) or bps. A throughput interface allows NATO personnel 
to monitor the performance and speed of their communications networks within the DCIS. This 
feature enables DCIS users to decide which network or data transmission method to be used as 
the fastest and most effective way of transmitting and receiving date to the different HQs and 
to peacekeepers in the field. If the throughput interface of the DCIS showed a communications 
network is slow, an alternative means of communication could be found.  
Another technical control of the NATO DCIS that enhances information security, is network 
layer cryptography. Network cryptography is the “conversion of data into a secret code for 
transmission over a public network”, as defined in the encyclopaedia section of the PC MAG 
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website. Cryptography when referring to presence of third parties in the context of peacekeep-
ing, can be referred to as adversaries. This means that information being transmitted by the 
DCIS over a public network is encrypted and more difficult to be intercepted by unintended 
recipients who also may be on the network, which one of the information securities threats of 
sending information over a public network.   
In the event situational awareness data was being inputted into the DCIS for transmission during 
a peacekeeping operation, for example, on the CAVNET network which was an IED situational 
awareness network used by peacekeeping organizations in Afghanistan, network layer cryptog-
raphy would minimise the risk of the sensitive information that is shared on the network being 
intercepted by the Taliban or other hostile forces. Sensitive information could include the lo-
cation of a friendly patrol, and if this information was intercepted by enemy forces, the oper-
ational security of the peacekeepers would be jeopardised because they would be vulnerable 
to an ambush, among many other possible security threats.  
5.2.4 Physical Controls 
The following physical controls of the NATO DCIS are not strictly information security controls, 
rather information technology controls. Because they relate to physical security measures that 
directly protect the IT equipment of the NATO DCIS, unlike traditional physical information 
security controls which mainly revolve around facility protection and security, such as facility 
protection and intrusion monitoring. Because of the relatively small and portable natures of 
deployable communications information systems, however, these physical information security 
controls are not entirely relevant for the NATO DCIS.  
Therefore, the following physical controls which will be referred to in the NATO DCIS analysis, 
as well as for the other information systems to be analyzed in this paper, will relate to IT 
security, rather than directly to information security. It could be argued, however, that IT 
security, is in-fact in interconnected to information security, because of the information secu-
rity practice of information assurance comprising of three components – confidentiality, integ-
rity, availability. Both the integrity and availability aspects of the information security practice 
of information assurance could be compromised if IT security is compromised, which is why it 
can be argued there is an interconnected dependency of functionality between IT security and 
information security. Because, if the physical security of IT equipment is compromised, the 
functionality of that IT equipment, and therefore the integrity of the data it may be storing 
could be compromised, for example, by being corrupted.  
And the availability of information of which a given piece of IT equipment may be responsible 
for managing, could also be compromised. Therefore, throughout the following information 
systems analyses, physical IT security controls, while not officially being defined in information 
security literature as information security controls, will be used interchangeably as information 
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security controls, too. Regarding the physical controls of the NATO DCIS which ensure the in-
tegrity of DCIS IT equipment, and therefore information security, is the ruggedness and tough-
ness design of the equipment. Deployable communications information systems like the DCIS 
must be capable of operating in any terrain and in extremely harsh environments which is why 
the IT equipment of such information systems, and the various information system components, 
particularly the system hardware, must durable enough to be transported in such environments 
without being physical compromised by physical or environmental conditions.  
To ensure this, the NATO DCIS has an operating range of between “-30 and +49 degrees Celsius” 
(DCIS 2014), meaning the systems can function at almost any environment in which humans are 
likely to operate, and continuity of information will not be compromised. Additionally, as the 
standard external structure that all DCIS systems are packaged with, the DCIS uses a biological 
and chemical proof” (DCIS 2014) tented environment, which forms the external and protectoral 
structure of the system. A “building of opportunity” (DCIS 2014) can also be used to house the 
DCIS, if for some reason during an operation, was to become more desirable to house the DCIS, 
providing further opportunities for physical protection. The equipment that forms the DCIS, is 
transported in portable, ruggedized cases “to ensure survivability of equipment in the most 
extreme environmental conditions” (DCIS 2014). 
5.3 BAE FALCON 
The BAE FALCON, used by the British Armed Forces, by and large, is very similar to the NATO 
DCIS, also providing "operational intelligence, situational awareness, operational planning and 
analysis, reporting and tasking, logistics, geographic information, modelling and simulation and 
collaboration tools" (DCIS 2014). While also similar the UN MCC, too, though differing in scale 
and layout. Regardless of the degree of similarity between the FAALCON and the previous to 
DCISs, the FALCON continues the notion shared by all three of the systems, that the communi-
cations aspect of information systems, in the form of situational awareness and command and 
control, is the main way information systems contribute to peacekeeper security. As is evident 
by the fact that the first key point on the BAE FALCON Fact Sheet is that the system "provides 
a secure internet for the battlespace, linking service personnel at all levels of command" (BAE 
Systems). 
Because of the hierarchical structure of the British Army, and the strong reliance on a hierar-
chical organizational command and control structure, as with all Armed Forces, FALCON’s in-
teroperability is achieved through the ability to serve as a "communication hub, linking nearly 
a hundred separate headquarters together"(BAE Systems). Figure 14 illustrates how this is 
achieved through creating both a Wide Area Network (WAN) and Local Area Network (LAN) 
“Falcon provides both a local area system, within the Command Post for example, and wide 
area systems which can, if required provide a secure link back to the UK”, as mentioned on the 
BAE FALCON Infographic (BAE Systems). 
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Figure 14: BAE FALCON Wide Area Network and Local Area Network Service Provision (BAE Sys-
tems 2011, 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the ability to create such a large and connected communications network, FALCON 
maintains an effective degree of information security, as "FALCON handles four different levels 
of information securely" from “restricted” through to “secret”, as according to the BAE Systems 
official FALCON Fact Sheet. Ensuring only people with an authorisation that matches the secu-
rity classification of information, can access it. Therefore, decreasing the chances of infor-
mation security breaches, which could impact the security of peacekeepers. In additional to 
internal operability of the system which ensures an entire organization is connected with each-
other during operations, FALCON provides external interoperability with other organizations to, 
meaning that in joint peacekeeping operations, “data and video information can be shared 
securely between Coalition partners” (BAE Systems). 
Regarding how the communications and internet capabilities which contribute towards opera-
tional and personnel security of peacekeepers, are achieved, in the BAE FALCON, it is the ability 
of the system to manage and transmit large amounts of data from different sources, simulta-
neously, and almost instantaneously, at both a local scale and global scale. This ensures that 
the BAE FALCON is capable of receiving, storing, processing, managing and sharing all mission-
critical information, (the most useful of which being in the form of situational awareness) en-
suring that command and control elements of the BAE FALCON can act upon that information 
KEY 
CPS: Command Post Station 
WASP: Wide Area Service Provision 
Satcom: Satellite Communications 
 
UAV: Unmanned Air Vehicle 
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accordingly, as illustrated in Lawson’s Model of Command & Control. To ensure operational and 
personnel security of peacekeepers. Because if there was a limit to the amount of data the 
system could process, this could limit the ability of commanders in the organization to make 
decisions that keep peacekeepers safe. 
To capably and effectively transmit large amounts of data, the system relies up the use of 
advanced internet protocol networks (IP networks) that enables data and situational awareness 
information to be communicated throughout the global and interoperable FALCON system. Sim-
ilarly, and equally important in allowing data not only to be sent, but received by different HQs 
and ground stations, is again the point that all the technological and communications compo-
nents of the system are connected, forming one big communications network. The “linking 
service personnel at all levels of command" (BAE Systems) aspect of the FALCON’s internet 
capabilities being the result, as according to the FALCON Fact Sheet. Figure 15 below depicts 
how this is achieved through data transmission and large-scale connectivity by providing both 
a “local area system” and “wide area systems which can, if required, provide a secure link back 
to the UK” (BAE Systems), as according to the official FALCON Infographic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the BAE FALCON information sharing process, which relies upon a network of hardware in-
terconnected to the BAE FALCON communications network infrastructure, as depicted in the 
above Figure 15. The first stage in the transmissions is that “data from an Unmanned Air Vehicle 
(UAV) is securely transmitted to a ground station” (BAE Systems). UAVs are satellites in space 
Figure 15: BAE FALCON Information Sharing and Command & Control Process (BAE Systems) 
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which have a bird’s eye view of the environment peacekeepers and friendly are operating in. 
UAV’s are therefore capable of capturing and potential threats in that environment through 
advanced cameras. The data from these cameras is then transmitted to a ground station in the 
operational environment where FALCON information system infrastructure is deployed. This 
data can then be relayed via satellite to a UK command centre, for analysis. 
When data is analyzed during a peacekeeping operation at the UK command centre, the UAV 
data may “reveal a potential threat to coalition forces” (BAE Systems). In this scenario, the 
FALCON information system can further be utilised in enabling command and control users of 
the system to create “a secure video conference” (BAE Systems) between UK command centre 
and regional HQ in the operational area. The commander in the operational area who receives 
the situational awareness through video conference or through another means of communica-
tion, then can decide to investigate the observed threat. If the decision is made to investigate 
the observed threat: “FALCON transmits vital information to ground troops and aircraft on pa-
trol in the region” (BAE Systems). The threat can then be engaged, and danger can be elimi-
nated, removing the threat to peacekeepers. For example, an insurgent, who could kill or injure 
a peacekeeper and also jeopardise security and continuity of the peacekeeping mission. When 
the threat has been engaged, a situational report can then be relayed back to Regional HQ and 
then the UK Command Centre. All of the communication processes and transmission of infor-
mation and data which sequentially occurs throughout the various stages of this monitoring, 
detection, and transmission processes, as illustrated in the above Figure 16, is able to happen 
because each technological component that receives information is interoperable and con-
nected to the overall BAE FALCON information system.  
In conclusion, BAE FALCON contributes to operational and personnel security largely through 
its advanced, global monitoring and information sharing information abilities enabling com-
mand and control elements to effectively make decisions based on situational awareness. These 
decisions from command which can be globally communicated throughout the organization, 
through transmitting data to ground stations, enables action to be taken and threats to be 
engaged, which ensure personnel and operational security and safety.  
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5.3.1 Administrative Controls 
Regarding the administrative information security controls of the BAE FALCON, the British Army 
personnel who operate the BAE FALCON, abide by strict information security standards and 
procedures. These procedures govern how information is handled in the information system. 
Information handling refers to the classification of information, disposal of information, re-
moval of information, storage of data and exchange of information.  
In the BAE FALCON, one of the most important security aspects of information handling proce-
dures, is the classification of information. Because once information has been given a level of 
security classification, users of the BAE FALCON can correctly exchange the information 
throughout the system and minimise the chance of information security incidents. The classifi-
cation of information applies to all information received from the various communication enti-
ties connected to the FALCON infrastructure, such as satellites, computers, and radios, which 
is to be communicated to through the FALCON information system.  
For example, similarly to how, in compliance with British Armed Forces information security 
procedures, “information is securely exchanged from UNCLASSIFIED up to SECRET”, as men-
tioned in the official 2011 FALCON Brochure. And the management and monitoring of the FAL-
CON network, which is an administrative control in and of itself, further reflects the importance 
of information classification, as again “access and control will depend upon a network man-
ager’s level of permissions and authority” (BAE Systems 2011). Ensuring only the right personnel 
have access permissions on a network, is a vital information security control to protect infor-
mation, because network managers have arguably the most power and control over a network. 
The classification of information is an information security measure that protects sensitive in-
formation. And depending on the level of classification of which certain sensitive information 
has been given, the appropriate access restrictions can be implemented to ensure the infor-
mation is exchanged by the appropriate methods, and to ensure that it is to be accessed only 
by people in the organization who have at least the same level of security clearance as the 
information that is being handled. For example, if information under the classification of SE-
CRET was exchanged to another domain within FALCON information system, only people with 
the correct security clearance would be able to view that information.  
Security classification is an effective information security measure in the BAE FALCON because 
minimises the chances of information leaks or breaches of sensitive information by implement-
ing access controls and restrictions relevant to the security classification of the information. 
When information is restricted, it ensures operational security and security of Armed Forces 
personnel. By ensuring mission sensitive information that could concern their safety, is at min-
imal vulnerability to information security threats which could lead to the information being 
received by unintended recipients.  
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In addition to information classification, facilities that are connected to the BAE FALCON are 
bound by security classifications whereby “each working area within the HQ can operate at its 
own security level, depending on the nationality and security clearance of the staff that have 
access to a particular area” (BAE SYSTEMS 2011). Meaning that facilities can only store infor-
mation matching the classification level the facility is carrying, and only people with at least 
the same security clearance allowed to access the facility which stores the information. Again, 
this minimises the chances of unintended recipients viewing the information.  
5.3.2 Technical Controls 
As a system that effectively but almost exclusively relies on IP networks to share and receive 
information, one of the most important technical controls of the BAE FALCON’s IP network, is 
the splitting of transmitted data. A given amount of data shared in the FALCON network, at a 
given time, known as ‘traffic’, is “split into small packets” (BAE Systems 2011). Each packet, 
will then individually, but simultaneously go through the network to securely reach the desti-
nation, as “FALCON automatically decides the route along which the message should be sent” 
(BAE Systems 2011). What makes the FALCON’s data splitting method even more effective in 
ensuring security and CIA of information, however, is the fact that FALCON automatically reacts 
to loss of network nodes (the connection points in a communications network where data is 
received, stored, and distributed along routes of a network), that may result from “enemy EW 
(Electronic Warfare), destruction of FALCON assets and the disruption caused when FALCON 
assets have to re-deploy in order to support manoeuvring troops” (BAE Systems 2011).  
Electronic warfare, both offensive and defensive, is the ability of forces to use the electro-
magnetic spectrum (signals including “radio, infrared or radar”) to gain the advantage in con-
flict. There are various was to conduct electronic warfare. As written by Don E. Gordon in 
Electronic Warfare (1981), methods include the use of signals as a means of “intercepting, 
locating, identifying, detecting, jamming, disrupting, deceiving, protecting, analyzing, and 
cryptanalyzing”. While it is less likely that adversary forces, which may be present in an area 
would have the technological capabilities of conducting such warfare to an effective degree 
again large-scale and technologically advanced C4I information system like the BAE FALCON, 
the above mentioned threats are nevertheless still very real threats that information systems 
like the FALCON must be protected against. And FALCON’s ability to react to node losses that 
may occur from the possibility of EW, is an effective way of doing so.  
Referring back to the main point of the FALCON achieving network traffic security, and the 
secure transmission of information, through data splitting, the reason is because data packets 
are more “resilient to destruction of parts of the network from hostile electronic and physical 
attack” (BAE Systems 2011). Again, enforcing the effectiveness of data splitting as a technical 
control which protects the FALCON’s data and assets, and ensures the CIA of information. Data 
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splitting works effectively, because at the data’s destination, “the packets are reassembled 
into their original form at the receiving end” (BAE Systems 2011).  
The technical control of data splitting, although differing in method, is similar to the NATO 
DCIS network layer cryptography method of encrypting data. In that they both have the same 
effect on the data that is being transmitted – data being transmitted on a network is re-arranged 
into a form that is indecipherable to unintended network users. Who may try and launch an 
electronic attack to intercept the data, between the points of information being transmitted 
from one domain to another within the information system.  
5.3.3 Physical Controls 
As a rugged and durable DCIS, designed to operate in all environments and be protected against 
the various kind of threats that may be present in a peacekeeping environment, the NATO DCIS 
is also equipped with similar physical controls to those of the UN MCC and the NATO DCIS. Such 
as rugged equipment cases and diverse operating temperatures. As the BAE FALCON is primarily 
a communications system, primarily relying on internet, largely through the “Bowman Combat 
Net Radio system and the Skynet SATCOM system” (BAE Systems 2011). The physical protection 
measures of the equipment that forms these systems, are achieved largely through the exterior 
structure that houses the equipment, as is the case with the 20-foot steel sea container exterior 
of the UN MCC, or the biological and chemical proof tent of the NATO DCIS.  
In the case of the BAE FALCON, where the equipment that forms the network of the system is 
used primarily in “WASP” (BAE Systems 2011) (Wide Area Service Provision) vehicles, through 
the “Trunk Communications System” (BAE Systems 2011), each WASP vehicle has a “container 
within which the FALCON equipment is operated” (BAE Systems 2011).Figure 16 below from the 
official BAE Falcon Overview document (BAE Systems 2011) below, illustrates the MAN HX60 
(left) used as the standard WASP vehicle in the FALCON WAS, and the FALCON communications 
radio (right), operated in the container seen at the rear of the MAN HX60. The combination of 
the physical protection offered by both the communications equipment, and containers of 
which the equipment is housed, create one very strong physical control, although it is the MAN 
HX60 vehicles themselves and the containers of which the trunk communications system is 
housed, that offers the most physical protection.  
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Of course, the equipment that forms the BAE FALCON system, such as radio headsets and lap-
tops, as with the previous two information systems, are extremely tough and durable, like the 
rugged Dell laptops used in the NATO DCIS. However, the equipment itself cannot match the 
toughness of the British Army’s military-grade trucks that house the FALCON Trunk Communi-
cations System - the MAN HX60. The MAN HX60 is armoured with steel and is extremely tough. 
It is also fitted with “a blast-proof vertical-split-windscreen”, as written by The New Haysalian 
Military. This blast proof windscreen can protect against small-arms fire and explosions, both 
of which are the most common threats to peacekeepers today and encountered frequently 
during peacekeeping operations, as has already been mentioned in referencing the report Im-
proving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (Cruz, Phillips, Cusimano 2017), Chapter 2.2.2 
of this thesis, ‘Peacekeeping Threats’ . 
The physical protection measures of the MAN HX60, such as the blast-proof windscreen, alt-
hough the British Army is not currently directly using it on any of the high IED risk peacekeeping 
operations it is attached to, is nevertheless still extremely relevant if the British Army was to 
employ use of the vehicle in any future conflicts areas. Because as is the case in certain peace-
keeping missions such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA), IEDs pose a significantly higher risk to peacekeeper than in others, and 
casualties from IEDs are increasing, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2.2.2 of this thesis, 
‘Peacekeeping Threats’, where the UN Secretary General in the December 2018 MISNMA ac-
counts the significant and increasing threat of IEDs in Mali. An increasing threat of IEDs has also 
been seen in other missions in different parts of the world too, though so physical protection 
measures of information systems such as the MAN HX60 blast-proof windscreen are highly rele-
vant and needed.  
Regarding the BAE FALCON’s Wide Area System (WAS), it is achieved, among other entities 
connected to the BAE FALCON including UAVs and satellites, primarily through many deployed 
MAN HX60 vehicles. Each connected to the BAE FALCON through the trunk communications 
Figure 16: BAE FALCON Trunk Communications System (BAE Systems 2011, 5) 
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system it contains. The fact that the ruggedized, durable, steel plated MAN HX60 comprises the 
bulk of the BAE FALCON’s physical infrastructure for which the communications technology is 
contained, is a physical control in and of itself. Because it ensures that the entire portion of 
the system which is deployed outside of operational HQs, remotely, in ‘the field’, and is there-
fore most likely to succumb to threats present in operational environments during peacekeeping 
operations, has adequate protection. Therefore, contributing towards continuity of communi-
cations, which in turn contributes towards the security of peacekeepers. Because the MAN HX60 
which houses the communications equipment of the BAE FALCON, is adequately equipped to 
deal with some of the most dangerous threats present in today’s peacekeeping environment – 
explosions and small arms fire. 
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6 Conclusions 
There is no doubt that peacekeeping organizations heavily rely on information systems during 
operations as a means of enacting peacekeeper security. Before concluding how and why infor-
mation systems contribute towards peacekeepers security, it must be first concluded that com-
munications networks, while designed primarily for the purpose of sharing information, are as 
effective in sharing situational awareness and ensuring peacekeeper security. Even if the net-
work is acting independently and not interconnected to a larger information system such as the 
BAE FALCON. 
Regarding the analyzed DCISs, it is clear that their administrative, technical, and physical con-
trols protect them against information security, respectively. Allowing the peacekeepers who 
depend on these systems to conduct peacekeeping operations as safely and securely as possible. 
While peacekeepers rely on the communications aspect of the information systems, they use 
on operations to enhance their safety and security, they rely equally upon the information 
security measures of their information systems too. If the information security of an information 
system is compromised, the security of peacekeepers may also be compromised.  
To minimise information security incidents occurring in the information systems of peacekeep-
ing organizations, this paper has shown that administrative controls must be such that an in-
formation system is easy and simple to use, yet still be security-tight and possess a wide range 
of communication and information management functions that enable the personnel operating 
the system to oversee all aspects of peacekeeping operations to protect peacekeepers. Without 
going into depth in analyzing the most important DCIS technical controls, it is apparent that 
they are crucial in ensuring continuity of a system and CIA of information, preventing infor-
mation security breaches, which could compromise information CIA. The information processed 
in an information system during a peacekeeping operation is mission sensitive and could be 
directly related to mission objectives and therefore the peacekeeper’s safety. Therefore, one 
could argue that technical controls are the most important control of an information system in 
ensuring physical security of peacekeepers. The physical controls of the DCISs analyzed in this 
paper reflect the diverse and often harsh and remote environments in which peacekeeping 
organizations operate. The physical controls of DCISs ensure that the systems can operate to 
the same standard, anywhere in the world, and in any environment that a peacekeeping organ-
ization may operate. This ensures that peacekeepers will always receive the same level of 
security and protection from the information systems they depend on.  
While there are differences between the UN MCC, NATO DCIS, and BAE FALCON DCISs analyzed 
in this paper, in terms of factors such as size, scalability, technological infrastructure, security 
controls etc, it has also been made clear, that there are certain similarities between them. 
One thing that has been made noticeably clear, is that the key underlying theme of all the 
systems, and of future DCISs to come, is the communications aspect. Again, while there are 
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various, albeit fairly slight differences relatively speaking and considering the fact the focus of 
the DCIS analysis in this paper has primarily been about how the functions of DCISs contribute 
towards peacekeeper security, it is the communications function of the DCISs which are share 
a common purpose between the systems. The communications function, although also differing 
between the three systems in terms of the exact technology and methods for executing it, 
shares the same purpose of contributing towards peacekeeper security.  
As it has been made apparent not only in chapter five, but also in chapters two and three, 
constant communications and a constant flow of information between peacekeepers on the 
field and operational HQs is required. Again, reflecting the similarity of the communications 
function between the UN MCC, NATO DCIS, and BAE FALCON, the form of communications that 
is required, and the form of communications that the three systems deliver, is operational 
intelligence and situational awareness. Crucially, so that C2 elements can analyze the data 
they receive, and act upon it accordingly, making accurate and informed decisions to mitigate 
threats present to peacekeepers, thus providing them security. Because of this, as well as the 
harsh and remote environments in which peacekeepers operate, DCISs are the most effective 
type of information system to peacekeeping organizations. This is because they are an easily 
transportable and quickly deployable command and control element, managing and communi-
cating information between peacekeepers on the field and fixed headquarters.  
In concluding the factors of Deployable Communication Information Systems that contribute to 
peacekeeper security, it is the combination of DCISs being robust, security tight and deployable 
enough, to act as a medium of which operational intelligence and situational awareness flows 
between operational environments and HQs, to be processed and acted upon by a command 
and control element, in any environment a peacekeeping organization will operate, which is 
the overall way in which information systems used by peacekeeping organizations contribute 
towards peacekeeper security.  
In addition to obtaining operational intelligence through sampling and field assessments, allow-
ing logistical preparedness to reduce casualties due to poor equipment, the process of infor-
mation systems obtaining intelligence and situational awareness that can be translated into 
situational understanding, is perhaps the single most important process that occurs in an infor-
mation system during peacekeeping operations to enhance peacekeeper security. So that Com-
mand and Control (C2) elements can act accordingly in making decisions and issuing commands 
that avert peacekeeper patrols from threats in operational environments. All being achieved, 
through the key enabler of interoperability in allowing information flow between an operational 
environment and Command and Control (C2) elements, as well as with other organizations on 
joint operations, so a constant state of situational awareness is maintained to prevent inaccu-
rate information or lack of information. Which can occur when stakeholders in an operation do 
not have access to information due to lack of interoperability. 
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Table 1 below represents the sequential stages of this information sharing process used by 
information systems to enhance peacekeeper security. While the graph following afterwards, 
concludes the necessary information security controls needed to maintain Confidentiality, In-
tegrity and Availability (CIA) of the information in information systems. It is the information 
security controls of the systems that not only ensure information CIA, but also continuity of the 
crucial process of intelligence and situational awareness being shared throughout information 
systems and therefore the ability to provide peacekeeper security. Because information CIA 
contributes to the continuity of the information systems themselves.  
Both Table 1 and Table 2, conclude the findings of this thesis in answering the two research 
questions of this thesis: ‘how, do information systems used in peacekeeping operations contrib-
ute to peacekeeper security ?’, and ‘how does information security, information CIA, and its 
relationship with information systems affect peacekeeper security?’. Because, when infor-
mation systems and information security are used in effectively in combination, utilising In-
teroperability and Command & Control, they are the two key enablers and contributors to 
peacekeeper security.  
  
 Table 1: How Information Systems Contribute to Peacekeeper Security 
Sequence Information Processes Methods Contributions to Peacekeeper Security 
1 Threat Detection & Identification 
• High zoom, high resolution imagery (Satellites, UAVs) 
• Surveillance equipment (CCTVs, motion sensors) 
• Visually by peacekeeper patrols 
• Field Assessments & Sampling: 
- High zoom, high resolution imagery (Satellites, UAVs) 
- Demographical data collection 
 
• Peacekeeper patrols and Command & Control ele-
ments can avert threats and coordinate a plan to neu-
tralize threats such as Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) 
 
- Mitigates chance of peacekeeper patrols succumb-
ing to surprise enemy attacks 
2 
Interoperable Commu-
nication: 
Situational Awareness 
• Deployable Communication Information Systems (DCIS) 
 
• Portable communications Devices: radios etc.  
 
• Satellite communication (SATCOM) 
 
• Wide Area Network (WAN) & Local Area (LAN) Internet 
Protocol (IP) networks 
 
• IP networks: both Wide Area Network (WAN) and Local 
Area Network (LAN) 
 
• Communication networks e.g. CAVNET 
• Situational Awareness shared in an interoperable in-
formation system ensures: all stakeholders in a peace-
keeping operation are aware of potential threats in an 
operational environment 
 
- Mitigates risk of peacekeeper patrols succumbing to 
threats 
3 
Command & Control 
(C2): 
Situational Under-
standing 
• Analysis of Situational Awareness data through data anal-
ysis tools to create Situational Understanding 
 
•Course of action decided from Situational Understanding 
through comparing current environmental state with desired 
environmental state (Lawson's Model of Command & Con-
trol) 
•Situation Understanding ensures Command & Control 
(C2) make accurate and informed decisions, translating 
into accurate and informed orders  
 
- Mitigates risk of peacekeeper patrols succumbing to 
threats through misinformation, inaccurate infor-
mation, which could lead to poor decisions 
4 
Command & Control 
(C2): 
Orders 
• Situational Understanding acted upon: Command & Con-
trol (C2) issues orders to a peacekeeper patrol(s)  
- Video conference 
- Telephone call 
• Strategic and operational decisions that neutralize or 
mitigate threats to peacekeepers in an operational en-
vironment issued from Command & Control elements 
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Table 2: Information Security Controls of Information Systems 
Information Security Controls 
 
Methods 
Contribution to Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
(CIA) of Information 
Administrative 
• Security classification and tiers e.g. unrestricted through to 
top secret,  
 
• Access controls to facilities,  
 
• Personnel training to operate Information System compo-
nents such as monitoring or Command & Control centres 
Mitigates risk of CIA compromise of information from hu-
man error 
Technical 
• Authentication solutions 
 
•Firewalls  
 
•Antivirus software  
 
•Data cryptography 
Mitigates risk of CIA compromise of information from 
cyber threats 
Physical 
• Physical Access & Surveillance Controls:  area security 
clearances, fences, gates, guards, security lighting, surveil-
lance equipment (CCTVs, motion sensors) 
 
• Environmental Controls: e.g. Humidity Ventilation Air Con-
ditioning (HVAC) 
• Equipment Protection: e.g. temperature and weather dura-
bility, physical toughness and durability 
Mitigates risk of CIA compromise of information from 
physical threats to tangible data assets 
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